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SHEDDING LIGHT ON 
THE FEDERAL COURTS’ TREATMENT 
OF HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS 
UNDER SECTION 1 OF 
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 
Allen G. Haroutounian* 
The federal judiciary’s application of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act to horizontal restraints remains one of the least defined 
areas of antitrust jurisprudence. Part of this problem stems from the 
Supreme Court’s failure to articulate clear guidelines since shifting 
from the widely used per se standard to the more comprehensive rule of 
reason and quick look approaches. Additionally, because the rule of 
reason analysis—the predominant standard used by federal courts 
today—places great emphasis on a defendant’s market power, the costs 
and burdens make it difficult for the plaintiffs to prove Section 1 
violations.  
This Article surveys recent lower federal court decisions to see how 
courts today analyze Section 1 claims, demonstrating that while 
considerable confusion still exists in the application of the per se, rule 
of reason, and quick look approaches to horizontal restraints, a small 
number of federal courts are beginning to apply these approaches with 
greater clarity. This Article also argues that the quick look approach 
should be abandoned because the per se approach and the rule of 
reason already provide sufficient means for analyzing horizontal 
restraints. Finally, this Article offers suggestions that shift the rule of 
reason analysis away from relying heavily on a defendant’s market 
power to determine whether a horizontal restraint violates Section 1. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The federal courts’ application of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act to horizontal restraints is not clear,
1
 causing some to 
consider it as “one of the darkest corners of antitrust law.”
2
 Much of 
this lack of clarity arose when the Supreme Court stopped 
determining the legality of some horizontal restraints under the per se 
approach—which applies to an agreement or conduct that appears on 
its face to be plainly anticompetitive—and began engaging in a more 
nuanced analysis under the rule of reason—which balances the net 
procompetitive efficiencies and anticompetitive effects of a 
defendant’s agreement or conduct.
3
 
This move away from the per se approach was driven by the fact 
that many horizontal restraints produced procompetitive efficiencies
4
 
or were necessary to make a product available.
5
 However, this shift 
has produced uncertainty among the federal courts because there is 
no single, unified standard for the courts to apply.
6
 Over the last 
twenty years, federal courts have even utilized a third method of 
analysis known as the “quick look approach,” which “applies in 
 
 1. The federal courts apply Section 1 to determine the legality of horizontal restraints. 
David C. Gustman & Jill C. Anderson, Joint Ventures and Other Competitor Collaborations, in 
46TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE 197, 207 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course 
Handbook Ser. No. 1484, 2005). A horizontal restraint is an agreement that restrains trade 
between two companies that compete with one another. Michael J. Denger et al., Vertical Price, 
Customer, and Territorial Restrictions, in 48TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE 295, 305 
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1602, 2007). Horizontal restraints can 
range from price-fixing agreements to joint ventures. Id. For an in-depth analysis of Section 1 and 
horizontal restraints, see infra Part II.  
 2. In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting 
Joseph F. Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary 
Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 453, 453 (1976)); Thomas A. Piraino Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule 
of Reason or Merger Analysis: A New Standard for Joint Ventures, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1, 12 
(1991). 
 3. Piraino, supra note 2, at 14–15. 
 4. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (1994). 
 5. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984). A horizontal 
restraint does not always have to produce a new product in order to trigger the application of the 
rule of reason. For example, the Supreme Court in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific 
Stationary & Printing Co. applied the rule of reason to a cooperative arrangement among a group 
of retailers aimed at reducing prices. 472 U.S. 284, 297 (1985). Similarly, in In re ATM Fee 
Antitrust Litigation, a district court in the Northern District of California applied the rule of 
reason to an agreement that eliminated the interchange fees of an ATM network. 554 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1016. 
 6. Piraino, supra note 2, at 2. 
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cases where per se condemnation is inappropriate but where no 
elaborate industry analysis [under the rule of reason] is required to 
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of an inherently suspect 
restraint.”
7
 
The courts’ inability to develop a unified standard for analyzing 
competitor collaborations is found not only in the application of the 
per se approach, the rule of reason, or the quick look approach but 
also in the application of the ancillary restraints doctrine. Under the 
ancillary restraints doctrine, the challenged agreement “must be 
subordinate and collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction.”
8
 This 
Article will point out, however, that there are varying interpretations 
of the ancillary restraints doctrine, which creates confusion in its 
application. To add more fuel to the fire, federal courts also employ 
different standards in determining how related a horizontal restraint 
must be to a defendants’ agreement or conduct under the ancillary 
restraints doctrine. For example, in order for a restraint to be 
ancillary, some courts hold that the restraint must be “essential” to 
the defendants’ agreement or conduct,
9
 while other courts hold that 
the restraint must be “reasonably” or “plausibly related” to the 
defendants’ agreement or conduct.
10
 This lack of unity makes it 
difficult for defendants to predict which level of scrutiny will apply 
in their cases. 
Another reason why the courts have been unable to articulate a 
consistent standard for analyzing horizontal restraints arises from the 
fact that competitors are collaborating in increasingly new and 
creative ways.
11
 For example, with regard to some joint ventures,
12
 
American firms have realized that the procompetitive efficiencies 
that result from entering into a joint venture may outweigh the 
 
 7. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2010). The quick 
look approach has its origins in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and 
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). See infra Part II.D.3. 
 8. Gustman & Anderson, supra note 1, at 213 (quoting Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas 
Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
 9. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures After the Supreme 
Court’s Dagher Decision, 57 EMORY L.J. 735, 746 (2008). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Piraino, supra note 2, at 2. 
 12. A joint venture is defined as “two or more firms agree[ing] to cooperate in producing 
some input that they would otherwise have produced individually, acquired on the market, or 
perhaps done without.” Gustman & Anderson, supra note 1, at 203. 
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anticompetitive conduct, if any, that the joint venture produces.
13
 
Thus, such firms are motivated to create collaborations that can 
result in innovative technologies, efficient production and 
manufacturing, and entry into new markets.
14
 Unfortunately, the 
inconsistency created by the federal courts has made it difficult for 
American businesses to know whether their joint venture will be 
upheld as valid under Section 1.
15
 
This Article analyzes how the federal courts decide which 
approach to apply in analyzing horizontal restraints. Specifically, this 
Article surveys how recent lower federal courts have interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s horizontal-restraint jurisprudence and describes the 
methods of analyses they employ in these cases. This Article also 
advocates three changes in the judiciary’s treatment of horizontal 
restraints by calling on the federal courts to do the following: (1) 
abandon the quick look approach because the rule of reason and per 
se approach already provide sufficient means for analyzing Section 1 
violations; (2) decide whether to apply the rule of reason or quick 
look approach by either analyzing the defendants’ procompetitive 
justifications for the restraint or using the ancillary restraints 
doctrine, which applies a “reasonably necessary” standard to 
determine how related a restraint must be to the horizontal 
agreement; and (3) employ a set of factors under the rule of reason, 
which will force the courts to move away from placing a heavy 
emphasis on a defendant’s market power in a relevant market. 
Part II of this Article offers an overview of horizontal 
agreements. Part II.A identifies Section 1 as the legal standard that 
governs horizontal restraints and describes what kinds of action 
trigger Section 1 scrutiny. Part II.B defines different types of 
horizontal agreements, focusing on joint ventures and the benefits 
and consequences resulting from such organizations in the 
marketplace. Part II.C summarizes the history of the federal 
judiciary’s treatment of horizontal agreement; Part II.D discusses the 
three types of analyses that courts use in analyzing Section 1 
 
 13. See Piraino, supra note 2, at 2. 
 14. See id. at 2–3. 
 15. See id. at 5. 
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violations: the per se approach, the rule of reason, and the quick look 
approach.
16
 
Next, Part III analyzes how the lower federal courts have drawn 
distinctions among these approaches and limited their application to 
different types of conduct. Part IV highlights crucial problems in the 
federal courts’ application of the three types of approaches, paying 
careful attention to how the courts unnecessarily emphasize market 
share analysis under the rule of reason. Part IV also argues that 
although considerable confusion is apparent in the lower courts’ 
application of the per se approach, the rule of reason, and the quick 
look approach, a small number of recent lower court decisions signal 
the possibility that these courts are finally distinguishing between the 
three approaches with greater confidence. Finally, Part V proposes 
that courts abandon the quick look approach, apply a more refined 
ancillary restraints doctrine, and adopt certain factors to better apply 
the rule of reason. Part VI concludes by reminding the federal courts 
that, in an attempt to solve these problems, the courts should strive 
for simplicity. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
This part first describes the threshold requirements that a 
plaintiff must meet in order to trigger Section 1 liability. Next, this 
part discusses the three approaches that lower federal courts use to 
analyze Section 1 claims: the per se approach, the rule of reason, and 
the quick look approach. Finally, this section summarizes the 
development of these three approaches in the federal courts. 
A.  The Legal Standard: 
The Sherman Antitrust Act 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act “applies only to 
concerted action that restrains trade.”
17
 Under Section 1, “[e]very 
 
 16. Justice Souter in California Dental Ass’n v. FTC suggested the possibility of another 
approach, one that lies between the quick look approach and the rule of reason. See infra note 
206. 
 17. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010). The Sherman Act distinguishes 
concerted action from independent action. Id. Concerted action occurs when “two or more entities 
that previously pursued their own interests separately [combine] to act as one for their common 
benefit” in restraining trade. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 
(1984). Concerted action carries with it a high degree of anticompetitive risk because it “deprives 
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contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States” is deemed illegal.
18
 Literally read, Section 1 can apply to 
every possible type of agreement, ranging from “a group of 
competing firms fixing prices [to] a single firm’s chief executive 
telling her subordinate how to price their company’s product.”
19
 
However, courts have not interpreted Section 1 literally.
20
 Instead, 
the Supreme Court has long recognized Congress’s intent that 
Section 1 should only apply to concerted action that unreasonably 
restrains trade.
21
 
To successfully plead a Section 1 violation, a plaintiff must 
show that two or more independent competitors, pursuing their own, 
separate economic goals, came together through an agreement or 
conduct, which subsequently resulted in anticompetitive effects, such 
as a “loss of actual or potential competition,” a “decrease in diversity 
of entrepreneurial interests,” or a “reduction of independent centers 
of decision making.”
22
 If the agreement produces such 
anticompetitive effects, then a defendant has likely violated Section 
1.
23
 
 
the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking [sic] that competition assumes and 
demands.” Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2209. It does not matter whether the alleged conspirators are 
a single entity or have a single name, or whether the parties seem like one firm or multiple firms. 
Id. at 2211–12. Instead, the court focuses on how the parties involved in the alleged 
anticompetitive conduct actually operate. Id. at 2209. 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The Sherman Act was adopted as Congress began to realize that 
more and more businesses were joining together in order to increase their market share and 
squeeze out competition. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade 
Practices § 46 (2009). The purpose behind the act was to replace the common law rules that 
addressed horizontal restraints with a uniform standard that “condemned such restraints whenever 
they occur[ed] in or affect[ed] interstate commerce.” Id. The common law at the time the 
Sherman Act was adopted made contracts, combinations, and agreements in restraint of trade 
illegal and unenforceable if they “restricted or suppressed competition in the market, fixed prices, 
divided marketing territories, apportioned customers, restricted production, [or] . . . raised prices.” 
Id. 
 19. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2208. 
 20. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–88 (1978). 
 21. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 
10 (1997) (stating that the Supreme Court “has long recognized that Congress intended to outlaw 
only unreasonable restraints”). 
 22. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212. 
 23. Id. at 2212. 
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B.  Horizontal Restraints of 
Trade and Commerce 
Horizontal and vertical restraints
24
 can be classified as concerted 
action under Section 1.
25
 A horizontal restraint is an agreement 
between companies that directly compete with one another at the 
same production or distribution level.
26
 Horizontal restraints are 
either naked or ancillary and can range in form from plain vanilla 
pricing-fixing agreements to highly integrated joint ventures where 
two companies collaborate to offer a product or service in an 
economically efficient manner.
27
 An ancillary restraint is a restraint 
that is created in addition to or after the initial collaboration between 
the competitors that allows them to reach the objectives of their 
initial agreement more effectively.
28
 For example, a joint venture is a 
collaborative activity that exists when “two or more firms agree to 
cooperate in producing some input that they would otherwise have 
produced individually, acquired on the market, or perhaps done 
without.”
29
 Thus, an ancillary restraint is created either before or 
 
 24. A vertical restraint is an “agreement between firms at different levels of distribution.” 
Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1219 (2008); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 
551 U.S. 877, 889–93 (2007) (discussing the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of 
vertical price restraints). Vertical agreements are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 25. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 24, at 1212, 1219–20, 1223, 1243. 
 26. Denger et al., supra note 1, at 305. 
 27. William J. Kolasky, Antitrust Treatment of Joint Ventures, in 50TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST 
LAW INSTITUTE 129, 131 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1738, 2009). 
 28. Claire E. Trunzo, Ancillary Restraints in a Competitive Global Economy: Does the 
Possibility Exist for an Ancillary Restriction to Be Reasonable in Light of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act?, 29 DUQ. L. REV. 291, 292–93 (1991). Section 188 of The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts states that an ancillary restraint is unreasonable if the “restraint is greater than is needed 
to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or . . . the promisee’s need is outweighed by the 
hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 188 (2010). Such examples include “a promise by the seller of a business not to 
compete with the buyer in such a way as to injure the value of the business sold [and] . . . a 
promise by a partner not to compete with the partnership.” Id. 
 29. Gustman & Anderson, supra note 1, at 203. The most common types of joint ventures 
include research and development, production/manufacturing, marketing, and network joint 
ventures. Mary L. Azcuenaga et al., Overview of the Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, in 48TH 
ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DISTRIBUTION & MARKETING 175, 180–83 (PLI 
Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1714, 2009). In a research and development 
joint venture, partners combine their research and development departments to develop new 
products more efficiently. Id. at 180. In a production/manufacturing joint venture, firms 
“collaborate to manufacture products, either to sell to consumers or for use by the parties 
themselves as an input in their own production process.” Id. In a marketing joint venture, parties 
“reduce costs, bring products to market more quickly, sell new products . . . or sell to new 
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after the parties form a joint venture, and it produces greater 
productivity or output that benefits the joint venture.
30
 Conversely, a 
naked restraint is an agreement that serves no purpose other than to 
eliminate competition.
31
 Such restraints include those that fix prices 
or reduce output. Courts declare naked restraints per se illegal and 
analyze ancillary restraints under the rule of reason.
32
 
Once a court determines that the defendant’s conduct is 
concerted action that triggers Section 1, it must then determine which 
method of analysis to use: per se or rule of reason. 
Conduct that falls under the per se approach is deemed illegal on 
its face, without any regard to surrounding circumstances.
33
 
Alternatively, conduct analyzed under the rule of reason is subject to 
 
customers that they otherwise would have been unable to reach on their own.” Id. at 181. In a 
network joint venture, parties collaborate “to create a system, or ‘network,’ that consumers can 
use to access a variety of things, including information and services.” Id. at 182. Research and 
development, production/manufacturing, and network joint ventures are generally viewed 
favorably by the courts because they produce competitive efficiencies with little anticompetitive 
effects. Id. at 180–83. On the other hand, marketing joint ventures are subject to more scrutiny 
because of the possibility that the collaborators can coordinate pricing and output decisions or 
allocate territories. See id. at 181–82. 
  Since the mid-1970s, joint ventures have become increasingly popular. Howard H. 
Chang et al., Some Economic Principles for Guiding Antitrust Policy Towards Joint Ventures, 
1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223 (1998). For example, in the information technology industry, two 
hundred joint ventures formed from 1970 to 1990. Id. at 228–29. Additionally, joint ventures 
between U.S. and foreign firms increased by as much as 27 percent per year between 1985 and 
1992. Id. at 229. 
 30. Consider a hypothetical example: 
Compu-Max and Compu-Pro are two major producers of a variety of computer 
software. Each has a large, world-wide sales department. Each firm has developed and 
sold its own word-processing software. However, despite all efforts to develop a strong 
market presence in word processing, each firm has achieved only slightly more than a 
10% market share, and neither is a major competitor to the two firms that dominate the 
word-processing software market. Compu-Max and Compu-Pro determine that in light 
of their complementary areas of design expertise they could develop a markedly better 
word-processing program together than either can produce on its own. Compu-Max 
and Compu-Pro form a joint venture, WORD-FIRM, to jointly develop and market a 
new word-processing program, with expenses and profits to be split equally. Compu-
Max and Compu-Pro both contribute to WORD-FIRM software developers 
experienced with word processing. 
FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS 
AMONG COMPETITORS app. § 3.2 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ 
ftcdojguidelines.pdf. 
 31. Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188–89 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 32. Trunzo, supra note 28, at 294–97. 
 33. E-mail from Daniel E. Lazaroff, Professor of Law and Leonard Cohen Chair in Law and 
Econs. and Dir., Loyola Sports Law Inst., Loyola Law Sch. of L.A. (Mar. 2, 2012, 08:59 PST) 
[hereinafter Mar. 2 E-mail from Daniel E. Lazaroff] (on file with author). 
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an inquiry based on a number of factors, most notably analysis of 
market power, to determine whether the particular restraint violates 
Section 1.
34
 In the last fifteen years, the courts have sparingly used a 
third method of analysis, known as the quick look approach, when it 
would be inappropriate to apply the per say approach but 
unnecessary to conduct an elaborate analysis of the relevant market 
under the rule of reason.
35
 
In deciding which method of analysis to apply, a court must 
ultimately consider whether the alleged conduct or agreement 
produces sound procompetitive efficiencies that outweigh its 
anticompetitive effects—i.e., the net procompetitive effects,
36
 To 
answer this question, courts either use the ancillary restraints 
doctrine or look to the defendant’s procompetitive justifications to 
determine whether the defendant’s conduct is more than just a naked 
price restraint or restriction on output.
37
 If under either approach the 
court determines that the defendant’s conduct or agreement is a 
naked restraint, it applies the per se approach.
38
 If, however, there 
appears to be potential for overall procompetitive effects, the court 
applies either the rule of reason or the quick look approach.
39
 
1.  Ancillary Restraints Doctrine 
William Howard Taft, then a judge on the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, introduced the ancillary restraints doctrine into American 
common law in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.
40
 Since 
 
 34. Piraino, supra note 4, at 1753–54. 
 35. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 36. Mar. 2 E-mail from Daniel E. Lazaroff, supra note 33. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See infra Part II.D.1. 
 39. E-mail from Daniel E. Lazaroff, Professor of Law and Leonard Cohen Chair in Law and 
Econs. and Dir., Loyola Sports Law Inst., Loyola Law Sch. of L.A. (Feb. 24, 2012, 14:12 PST) 
(on file with author). 
 40. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898); see also Gregory J. Werden, The Ancillary Restraints 
Doctrine, in RULE OF REASON V. PER SE: WHERE ARE THE BOUNDARIES NOW? 1, 1 (Am. Bar 
Assoc. Section of Antitrust Law ed., 2006), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-
committees/at-s1/pdf/spring-materials/2006/werden06.pdf (stating that Judge Taft imposed the 
ancillary restraint doctrine into the Sherman Act jurisprudence in his Addyston Pipe opinion). In 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., Judge Taft wrote that 
no conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is 
merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the 
covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him 
from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party. 
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then, there have been varying interpretations of the doctrine.
41
 
Regardless of which interpretation of the ancillary restraint doctrine 
a court uses, it initially determines whether there may be plausible or 
credible procompetitive justifications that result from the defendant’s 
restraint.
42
 If a restraint is ancillary, the defendant’s restraint may 
have procompetitive efficiencies.
43
 
Under the first definition, a restraint is ancillary or nonancillary 
depending on whether it carries the “potential to facilitate the 
accomplishment of a joint venture’s legitimate objectives.”
44
 If the 
defendant’s agreement “promoted enterprise and productivity at the 
time it was adopted,” the court must apply the rule of reason to 
analyze this agreement with greater scrutiny.
45
 Thus, whether the 
restraint is ancillary is clearly distinct from whether it is reasonable 
because the court only decides if the defendant’s restraint creates 
some plausible basis for procompetitive efficiencies that would then 
allow it to analyze the restraint under the rule of reason.
46
 
A second definition of the ancillary restraints doctrine conflates 
the issue of whether the restraint is ancillary with the question of 
whether it is reasonable.
47
 Under this interpretation, an ancillary 
restraint is lawful so long as it is “reasonably ‘related to the 
efficiency sought’” by the defendants’ initial agreement.
48
 Since a 
 
85 F. at 282. In Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, the Court stated in dicta about the ancillary restraints 
doctrine: 
[It] governs the validity of restrictions imposed by a legitimate business collaboration, 
such as a business association or joint venture, or nonventure activities. Under the 
doctrine, courts must determine whether the nonventure restriction is a naked restraint 
on trade, and thus invalid, or one that is ancillary to the legitimate and competitive 
purposes of the business association, and thus valid. 
547 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (citations omitted). 
 41. See generally Werden, supra note 40 (discussing various approaches to the ancillary 
restraint doctrine). 
 42. E-mail from Daniel E. Lazaroff, Professor of Law and Leonard Cohen Chair in Law and 
Econs. and Dir., Loyola Sports Law Inst., Loyola Law Sch. of L.A. (Mar. 2, 2012, 14:45 PST) 
(on file with author). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Werden, supra note 40, at 4. 
 45. Id. (quoting Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985)).  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. James H. “Hart” Holden, Joint Ventures and the Supreme Court’s Decision in Texaco, 
Inc. v. Dagher: A Win for Substance over Form, 62 BUS. LAW. 1467, 1476–77 (2007). 
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court considers ancillary restraints reasonable under this definition, 
all ancillary restraints are lawful.
49
  
Finally, under a third definition, a restraint is ancillary “if [it is] 
reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of a [joint] venture’s 
efficiency-enhancing purposes.”
50
 Under this approach, an ancillary 
restraint is analyzed along with the formation of the joint venture, 
while a nonancillary restraint is analyzed separately from the joint 
venture.
51
 For example, if a restraint produces a “loss of independent 
decision making” among competitors in the market but is 
“reasonably necessary” to make the joint venture more efficient, the 
restraint is ancillary.
52
 On the other hand, if a restraint is 
nonancillary, the court analyzes only the restraint, with no 
consideration of the joint venture.
53
 Under this definition, a court 
may condemn a nonancillary restraint in a joint venture as per se 
illegal despite the potential procompetitive efficiencies that may 
result from that joint venture.
54
 Alternatively, if the joint venture is 
legitimate, a court analyzes the joint venture and its ancillary 
restraint together under the rule of reason.
55
 Thus, unlike the second 
definition of the ancillary restraints doctrine, this definition does not 
conflate the issue of whether the restraint is ancillary with the 
question of whether the restraint is reasonable. This is because 
 
 49. Werden, supra note 40, at 4. 
 50.  Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview, 66 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 701, 734 (1998). Such a restraint “may be reasonably necessary to the achievement of the 
efficiency-enhancing purposes . . . in a variety of ways.” Id. at 707. For example, a 
restraint may make the venture itself operate more efficiently[,] . . . prevent a [member 
of the] joint venture from appropriating an undue share of the venture’s benefits[,] . . . 
prevent nonparticipants from appropriating joint venture benefits for which they have 
not shared costs[,] . . . [or] prevent unintended . . . consequences that might make the 
joint venture uneconomic. 
Id. 
 51. Werden, supra note 40, at 4. 
 52. For example, in Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., then-Judge 
Sotomayor concluded in her concurrence that the exclusivity and profit-sharing provisions in 
Major League Baseball Properties’ (MLBP) agreement were “reasonably necessary to achieve 
MLBP’s efficiency-enhancing purposes because [the provision] eliminate[d] . . . potential 
externalities” that would “limit the potential efficiency gains of [the] MLBP.” 542 F.3d 290, 340 
(2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). After making this determination, Sotomayor 
concluded that MLBP’s restraint should be analyzed together with the defendants’ joint venture 
under the rule of reason. Id. 
 53. Werden, supra note 50, at 734. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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initially, a court is only concerned with whether the defendant’s 
restraint produces potential procompetitive efficiencies that warrant 
further analysis under the rule of reason. 
2.  Procompetitive Justifications 
If a federal court does not use the ancillary restraints doctrine to 
determine whether to apply the per se approach, it looks to the 
procompetitive justifications offered by the defendant to reach this 
decision.
56
 Again, when determining whether to apply the rule of 
reason, the court makes a preliminary determination to see whether 
there may be plausible or credible procompetitive justifications for 
the defendants’ restraint.
57
 If the court believes that the defendants’ 
restraint may create potential benefits, this is enough to trigger the 
rule of reason.
58
 
This analysis is separate from the one the court conducts under 
the rule of reason, where the court considers the procompetitive 
justifications that the defendants offer to rebut the claim that their 
conduct or agreement violates Section 1.
59
 Here, the court’s analysis 
of the defendants’ procompetitive justifications parallels its analysis 
under the ancillary restraints doctrine, where it determines whether 
the defendants’ restraint is naked or ancillary. For example, in a joint 
venture, the parties integrate their resources while simultaneously 
competing with one another in the areas not covered by the joint 
venture.
60
 This generates competitive efficiencies, such as reduced 
cost, higher output, and better quality, which in turn produce many 
advantages, including the addition of a new competitor to the market, 
the facilitation of “market entry primarily through risk-sharing and 
the fusion of complementary resources,” and the ability to “penetrate 
new markets which its partners [individually] could not have 
 
 56. E.g., California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d. 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc); Salvino, 542 F.3d at 307–08. 
 57. Mar. 2 E-mail from Daniel E. Lazaroff, supra note 33. 
 58. Id.; see, e.g., Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 212, 
219 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (concluding that the rule of reason, not the per se approach, should apply 
simply because “MLBP’s role in licensing [Major League Baseball (MLB)] intellectual property 
[was] not a naked restraint on trade”), aff’d, 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 59. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 60. Gustman & Anderson, supra note 1, at 204. 
  
1186 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1173 
 
entered . . . .”
61
 The court will apply the rule of reason where the 
defendants’ agreement or conduct produces procompetitive 
efficiencies “that could not have been achieved independently.”
62
 
This suggests that the more integrated a joint venture is, the more 
likely a court is to apply the rule of reason. 
Although the court either uses the ancillary restraints doctrine or 
looks to the defendant’s procompetitive justifications to determine 
whether to apply the rule of reason or per se approach, it essentially 
conducts the same analysis under both methods to answer the 
ultimate question of whether the defendant’s conduct or agreement 
produces procompetitive efficiencies. In other words, the defendant 
succeeds under the rule of reason if the court finds that the 
defendant’s restraint is reasonable under the ancillary restraints 
doctrine or that the defendant’s procompetitive justifications are 
legitimate. 
This process of either using the ancillary restraints doctrine or 
considering the defendant’s procompetitive justifications is best 
illustrated by the majority and concurring opinions in Major League 
Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc.
63
 This case concerned 
whether Major League Baseball Properties (MLBP) violated Section 
1 by designating itself as the exclusive licensing agent for Major 
League Baseball (MLB).
64
 In upholding the district court’s decision 
to apply the rule of reason, the Salvino court did not use the ancillary 
restraints doctrine.
65
 Rather, it focused on Salvino’s arguments that 
 
 61. Piraino, supra note 2, at 8–9. The joint venture between Boeing, an aircraft 
manufacturer, and several Japanese manufacturers to produce and share the immense cost of 
producing a new commercial aircraft illustrates such efficiencies. Id. at 9. The efficiencies that 
joint ventures produce, however, are not free of anticompetitive effects. Joseph F. Brodley, Joint 
Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1530–32 (1982). A joint venture can 
produce anticompetitive effects, including “collusion,” “loss of potential competition,” or “market 
exclusion and access discrimination.” Id. 
 62. Azcuenaga et al., supra note 29, at 184. For example, in Salvino, the Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision to apply the rule of reason to Major League Baseball 
Properties’ conduct because Salvino failed to prove that MLBP’s conduct reduced output. 
Salvino, 542 F.3d at 306–07, 334. Therefore, per se treatment was inappropriate because MLBP’s 
conduct was “not a naked restraint on trade.” Id. at 307. Similarly, quick look treatment was 
inappropriate because the “casual observer could not summarily conclude that MLBP’s 
arrangement has an anticompetitive effect on customers.” Id. 
 63. 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 64. Id. at 293–94. 
 65. Id. at 334 (holding that the rule of reason, and not the per se or quick look approach, 
applied to MLBP’s licensing agreement). 
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the MLBP’s conduct amounted to a restriction on output and price 
and, therefore, did not produce any procompetitive efficiencies.
66
 In 
rejecting Salvino’s arguments, the Second Circuit pointed to 
deficiencies in Salvino’s presentation of evidence.
67
 
In her concurring opinion, then-Judge Sotomayor agreed with 
the majority’s holding that analyzing MLBP’s conduct under the rule 
of reason was appropriate, but she instead used the ancillary 
restraints doctrine to reach that conclusion.
68
 Judge Sotomayor 
argued that the ancillary restraints doctrine was the “superior method 
for analyzing the challenged restraint [in the case] because it 
effectively isolates when an exclusive arrangement should be viewed 
under the rule of reason, as a reasonably necessary part of a joint 
venture, and when it should be reviewed as a naked restraint.”
69
 
According to Judge Sotomayor, the exclusivity provision that 
made the MLBP the exclusive licensor of MLB’s intellectual 
property was “reasonably necessary to achieve MLBP’s efficiency-
enhancing purposes because [the provision] eliminate[d] . . . 
potential externalities that [would] otherwise distort the incentives of 
individual [c]lubs and limit the potential efficiency . . . of MLBP.”
70
 
As a result, Judge Sotomayor believed that MLBP’s “restraints must 
be viewed as ancillary to the joint venture and reviewed under the 
rule of reason in the context of the joint venture as a whole.”
71
 Thus, 
 
 66. Id. at 318–21. 
 67. Id. at 318–34. The court held that Salvino could not prove that the agreement between 
MLB and the MLBP “limit[ed] output.” Id. at 319. The only evidence that Salvino pointed to 
showed that the output had, in fact, increased. Id. at 319. Furthermore, according to the court, 
Salvino misunderstood what a price restriction is: what he thought was an agreement to fix prices 
was actually a profit sharing agreement. Id. at 320. Finally, the court also pointed out that Salvino 
unsuccessfully and incorrectly drew comparisons between this case and Broadcast Music, Inc. 
and NCAA. Id. at 320–25. 
 68. Id. at 341 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 69. Id. This is similar to the third interpretation of the ancillary restraints doctrine discussed 
in Part II.B.1. 
 70. Id. at 340. According to Judge Sotomayor, one of the most notable externalities that the 
exclusivity provision would eliminate is the free-rider problem. Id. Free riding in this context 
occurs if one baseball club gains an advantage over other clubs from MLB’s licensing of its 
products. Id. In fact, Judge Sotomayor pointed out that both Salvino and the MLBP admitted that 
the externalities are in place to promote efficiency, and without them, any progress the MLBP 
made in gaining efficiencies would be lost. Id. 
 71. Id. Judge Sotomayor criticized the majority for failing to recognize that this exclusivity 
agreement differed from the blanket licensing agreement in Broadcast Music, Inc. and for further 
failing to offer analysis as to this distinction. Id. at 341. 
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after initially determining that there was a potential for 
procompetitive efficiencies, Judge Sotomayor concluded that these 
justifications must be analyzed under the rule of reason and 
concurred with the majority’s rule of reason analysis.
72
 
In Salvino, the majority opinion—which considered Salvino’s 
procompetitive justifications—and the concurring opinion—which 
used the ancillary restraints doctrine—both reached the same 
conclusion that the rule of reason, not the per se approach, should be 
applied to MLBP’s conduct. However, this is not surprising given 
that both approaches aim to answer whether the defendant’s alleged 
conduct or agreement produces net procompetitive efficiencies. 
C.  Treatment of Horizontal Agreements 
Since the Passage of Section 1 
The law of horizontal restraints did not develop overnight. When 
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, it delegated 
broad authority to the courts “to develop [the] federal ‘common law’ 
of antitrust regulation.”
73
 Since then, the federal courts have been 
responsible for developing the rule of law for American businesses.
74
 
During the first thirty years after the Sherman Act’s enactment, the 
largest issue that the federal courts faced was the scope of the 
Sherman Act’s restrictions and the extent to which these restrictions 
affected American businesses such as “steel, oil, and railroad 
trusts.”
75
 One thing that was certain, however, was that the federal 
courts had a duty to regulate competition among American firms 
under the Sherman Act.
76
 
 
 72. Id. While at first glance it may seem that Judge Sotomayor utilized the second definition 
of the ancillary restraints doctrine, which conflates the issue of whether a restraint is ancillary 
with whether the restraint is reasonable, she did not. Instead, Judge Sotomayor first determined 
that MLBP’s restraint had a potential to produce procompetitive efficiencies and, therefore, was a 
reasonable part of the joint venture. Based on this, Judge Sotomayor pointed out that the 
application of the rule of reason was appropriate and concurred with the majority’s rule of reason 
analysis. 
 73. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Harvard and Chicago Schools: A New Antitrust 
Approach for the 21st Century, 82 IND. L.J. 345, 346 (2007). 
 74. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Common Law for the Twenty-First Century, 2009 
UTAH L. REV. 635, 636 (2009). 
 75. Id. at 638. 
 76. Id. 
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Following this initial era, the courts transitioned into a period 
known as “the Harvard Era.”
77
 From the 1930s to the 1960s, the 
courts turned their attention to ensuring that big businesses did not 
harm the American consumers by taking advantage of their large 
market power.
78
 As a result, the courts looked out for small 
businesses, scrutinizing “a wide range of competitive conduct” that 
potentially harmed these businesses.
79
 During this time, the per se 
approach was the dominant method of analysis used to analyze 
horizontal restraints.
80
  
Then, beginning in the 1970s, a new school of thought has 
emerged known as “the Chicago Era.”
81
 Under this ideology, courts 
view antitrust laws as a way “to increase the efficiency of the 
American economy” rather than adopting the Harvard Era’s view 
that small businesses should be protected from big businesses that 
abuse their market power.
82
 As the federal courts began to better 
understand economic theory, they started to move away from the per 
se approach and toward the rule of reason.
83
 The courts realized that 
the per se approach held certain conduct illegal, even if it provided 
legitimate, competitive efficiencies.
84
 
Over the past twenty years, there has been a trend in the federal 
court system toward recognizing that, while markets must be 
respected, courts must intervene to protect consumers and prevent 
harm from conduct that arises from aggressive competition.
85
 
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated the Antitrust Guidelines 
for Collaborations Among Competitors (the “Collaboration 
Guidelines”) in 2000 in order to provide greater “clarity [and 
guidance to businesspeople] regarding their treatment under antitrust 
laws.”
86
 The Collaboration Guidelines describe the analytical 
framework that the FTC and DOJ use “to assist businesses in 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Piraino, supra note 4, at 1755–56. 
 81. Piraino, supra note 74, at 638. 
 82. Id. at 638–39. 
 83. Piraino, supra note 4, at 1754. 
 84. Id. at 1756–57. 
 85. Piraino, supra note 74, at 639–40. 
 86. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 1. 
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assessing the likelihood of an antitrust challenge to a collaboration 
with one or more competitors.”
87
 The purpose of the Collaboration 
Guidelines is to help competitors understand how the agencies 
interpret antitrust law so that when these competitors are evaluating a 
potential collaboration, they know with greater certainty whether 
their collaboration will violate Section 1.
88
 This, in turn, will 
“encourage procompetitive collaborations, [deter] collaborations 
likely to harm competition and consumers, and [facilitate] the 
Agencies’ investigation of collaborations.”
89
 
Since 2009, the Obama Administration has taken an aggressive 
stance toward enforcing antitrust laws, arguing that corporations 
should not be allowed to abuse their large market power to “elbow 
out [other] competitors or to keep them from gaining market 
share.”
90
 Instead, Christine Varney, the Director of the Antitrust 
Division at the DOJ, has clearly stated that it must return to focusing 
on the ultimate goal of antitrust law: protecting the consumer.
91
 
D.  The Three Methods of Analysis: 
Per Se, Rule of Reason, and Quick Look 
As discussed in Part II.B, the federal courts apply one of three 
different analyses to determine whether a horizontal restraint violates 
Section 1: the per se approach, the rule of reason, or the quick look 
approach. This section chronicles the history of how the federal 
courts have developed and applied each approach.  
 
 
 87. Id. at 2. Some have argued that the Collaboration Guidelines need to be revised because 
of key Supreme Court decisions—including Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher and American Needle, Inc. v. 
National Football League—that address joint ventures. See Robert A. Skitol, Are the Competitor 
Collaboration Guidelines Ripe for Revision?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2010, at 55. 
 88. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 2. 
 89. Id. The D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32 
(D.C. Cir. 2005), demonstrates how the FTC brought a Section 1 challenge against a joint venture 
between two record labels, Warner and Polygram. Kolasky, supra note 27, at 145–46. Here, 
Polygram and Warner entered into a joint venture to “distribute recordings from the third concert” 
of a three-part concert series by the Three Tenors. Id. at 146. Warner and Polygram realized that 
the third recording would have been less profitable and therefore “agreed not to advertise or 
discount either of the earlier recordings for a ten-week period surrounding the launch of the third 
recording.” Id. The district court upheld the FTC’s finding that Polygram and Warner’s 
agreement violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id. at 145. 
 90. Stephen Labaton, Obama Takes Tougher Antitrust Line, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/business/economy/12antitrust.html?pagewanted=all. 
 91. Id. 
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1.  Application of the Per Se Approach  
by the Federal Courts 
 
The Sherman Act makes a combination per se illegal if it was 
“formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, 
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in 
interstate . . . commerce” per se illegal.
92
 In other words, an 
agreement or conduct that appears “so plainly anticompetitive” 
carries a presumption of per se illegality.
93
 For example, conduct that 
“almost always” results in a reduction of competition or output is 
anticompetitive on its face and is per se illegal.
94
 As a result, under 
the per se approach, the court need not engage in the “elaborate 
industry analysis” required by the rule of reason.
95
 
Under the per se approach—the most direct method for 
challenging the reasonableness of a restraint—courts presume the 
competitive effect of the challenged conduct or agreement without 
any inquiry into the claimed business purpose, anticompetitive harm, 
or overall competitive effects.
96
 In analyzing a joint venture, a court 
 
 92. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). The Supreme Court 
announced the per se rule for the first time in Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Travis J. Hill & Stephanie 
B. Lezell, Antitrust Violations, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 245, 250 (2010). In this case, the defendant 
oil companies were able to charge higher prices for their own products as a result of their having 
bought “low-priced distressed gasoline from independent refineries.” Donald L. Beschle, “What, 
Never? Well, Hardly Ever”: Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust 
Illegality, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 477 (1987). In holding that the defendants’ conduct violated the 
Sherman Act, the Court held that “it was irrelevant that the defendants lacked sufficient market 
power to actually achieve their goals.” Id. 
 93. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1979). 
 94. Id. at 19–20. 
 95. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986). The rationale behind the per se 
approach is that if a restraint is anticompetitive on its face, then courts need not engage in a 
“complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry 
involved” in order to deem that restraint “unreasonable.” Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 
457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982) (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). For an 
in-depth analysis of the defendant’s market share in a relevant market, see supra Part IV.C. 
 96. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 24, at 1213–14. In Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United 
States, Justice Blackmun explained the appropriateness and need for per se rules. 356 U.S. 1, 5 
(1958). Justice Blackmun wrote: 
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on 
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be 
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they 
have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se 
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the 
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the 
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considers the level of integration between the parties when 
determining whether to apply the per se approach.
97
 The more joint 
ventures integrate resources, the less likely they will be subject to per 
se scrutiny.
98
 The Collaboration Guidelines employ the same 
analysis to evaluate whether the challenged restraint is per se 
illegal.
99
 
By the 1960s, the per se approach was widely used by federal 
courts at all levels because of its many benefits.
100
 For example, this 
approach easily applied to a wide variety of conduct and agreements, 
which conserved the judicial system’s resources by cutting the cost 
and length of trials.
101
 At the same time, the per se approach 
functioned as a deterrent to anticompetitive conduct.
102
 However, as 
courts became more versed in economic theory, it became apparent 
increasingly apparent that the per se approach was too inflexible.
103
 
The central problem with the per se approach was that it kept 
potentially beneficial business from forming because courts applied 
it “mechanically” without considering the potential procompetitive 
efficiencies generated by many of the challenged collaborations.
104
 
In 1979, the Supreme Court, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,
105
 
recognized the need to depart from the per se approach and move 
toward the rule of reason.
106
 Since then, the Court has limited the 
application of the per se approach while expanding the use of the rule 
of reason.
107
 
 
necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the 
entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to 
determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable—an inquiry so 
often wholly fruitless when undertaken. 
Id. 
 97. Azcuenaga et al., supra note 29, at 184. 
 98. Id. 
 99. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 8. 
 100. Piraino, supra note 4, at 1755–56. 
 101. Id. at 1756. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1756–57. 
 105. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 106. Piraino, supra note 4, at 1758. 
 107. Id. at 1753–54. 
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2.  Application of the Rule of Reason 
Approach by the Federal Courts 
In 1918, the Supreme Court formally defined the rule of reason 
in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States.
108
 Since then, 
the Court has maintained that under the rule of reason, the central 
inquiry is “whether the challenged agreement [or conduct] is one that 
promotes . . . or one that suppresses competition.”
109
 Similarly, the 
Collaboration Guidelines define the rule of reason approach as an 
“analysis [that] focuses on the state of competition with, as compared 
to without, the relevant [horizontal] agreement” between the 
competitors.
110
 The purpose of the rule of reason is to recognize that 
certain restraints on competition are necessary if the collaborators’ 
“product is to be available at all.”
111
 
The first step a plaintiff must satisfy under the rule of reason is 
to prove that the defendant’s “alleged conduct or agreement . . . 
produces . . . anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and 
geographic markets.”
112
 The plaintiff can prove this by 
demonstrating the “existence of actual anticompetitive effects” of the 
defendant’s agreement or conduct or that the defendant has market 
 
 108. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is 
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily 
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before 
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. 
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular 
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.”). The rule of reason was 
first suggested in an early English case, Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. (Q.B.) 347. At 
issue in that case was a promise by a seller of a bakery that he would not compete with his 
purchaser. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). The Mitchel 
court upheld the covenant as reasonable because the long-term benefits of increasing the 
business’s marketability outweighed any negative effects on competition. Id. at 688–89. 
 109. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 691. 
 110. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 10. “The central 
question is whether the relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the ability or 
incentive profitably to raise price above or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below 
what likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement.” Id. 
 111. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984). Even without 
the creation of a new product, there may be efficiencies that justify the application of the rule of 
reason. For example, a restraint that produces efficiencies, cuts cost, or increases the quality of a 
product receives treatment under the rule of reason. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 112. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
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power
113
 in a particular market for goods and services.
114
 For 
example, in TYR Sport, Inc. v. Warnaco Swimwear, Inc.,
115
 a district 
court in the Central District of California held that TYR Sport met its 
burden of proof regarding the defendant’s market power by 
providing sufficient evidence that the market for performance 
swimwear in the United States was a distinct market, separate from 
the international market.
116
 Sometimes, however, the plaintiff and 
defendant offer conflicting sets of data that frame the scope of the 
relevant market to each party’s benefit, making it difficult for the 
court to accept one party’s definition over the other’s.
117
 In these 
circumstances, the definition of the relevant market is left to the 
jury.
118
 
If the plaintiff meets the initial burden of proving actual 
anticompetitive effects or adequate market power, the defendant is 
 
 113. The Supreme Court has defined market power as “the ability to raise prices above those 
that would be charged in a competitive market.” NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 n.38. Market power may 
be proven through “evidence of specific conduct undertaken by the defendant that indicates he 
has the power to affect price or exclude competition,” or “alternatively, market power may be 
presumed if the defendant controls a large enough share of the relevant market.” United States v. 
Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003). A relevant market is made up of two types of 
markets: a geographic market and a product market. Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist 
Health, 591 F.3d 591, 596 (8th Cir. 2009). A geographic market is the “geographic area ‘in which 
the seller operates and to which . . . purchasers can practicably turn for supplies.’” Id. at 598 
(quoting Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)). A court defines the 
size of a geographic market by considering several factors such as “‘[p]rice data and such 
corroborative factors as transportation costs, delivery limitations, customer convenience and 
preference, and the location and facilities of other producers and distributors.’” Lantec, Inc. v. 
Novell, Inc., 306 F.3d 1003, 1027 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting T. Harris Young & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Marquette Elec., Inc., 931 F.2d 816, 823 (11th Cir. 1991)). Product market, on the other hand, is 
defined as being “composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes 
for which they are produced—price, use and qualities considered.” United States v. E. I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956). 
 114. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 610 F.3d at 830. 
 115. 709 F. Supp. 2d 802 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 116. Id. at 816. The court found relevant a number of factors in holding that the U.S. market 
for swimwear was distinct from the international market. For example, the Executive Vice 
President of TYR Sport testified to numerous barriers to competition, including “1) the ability to 
provide local technical support; 2) on-the-ground customer service networks able to quickly 
respond to the needs of elite swim teams; 3) relationships with athletes, coaches, and swim 
directors; 4) cultural differences in suit preferences; [and] 5) differences in physiology of 
swimmers from country to country . . . .” Id. 
 117. Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharm., Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 38, 62 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 118. Id. For example, in Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a district court in the 
District of Columbia left the definition of the oral contraceptive market to the jury because both 
the plaintiff and defendant defined the relevant market to their own benefit, which left the court 
with a disputed version of the defined market. Id. 
  
Summer 2012] SHEDDING LIGHT 1195 
 
given the opportunity to prove that its conduct or agreement 
“promotes a sufficiently procompetitive objective.”
119
 If the 
defendant is unable to offer any procompetitive justifications, the 
inquiry ends and the challenged restraint is illegal under the rule of 
reason.
120
 For example, in United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.,
121
 the 
DOJ challenged Visa and Mastercard’s exclusionary rule, which 
“prohibit[ed] members of their networks from issuing American 
Express or Discover cards.”
122
 There the court rejected the 
defendant’s proposed procompetitive justification that the 
exclusionary rule served to “promote ‘cohesion’ within the 
Mastercard and Visa networks.” The Second Circuit upheld the 
district court’s finding that the exclusionary rule was not necessary to 
promote cohesion and that, even if it was, its precompetitive effects 
did not outweigh its anticompetitive ones.
123
 If, however, the 
defendant offers sound procompetitive justifications, the plaintiff 
then must prove that these proffered justifications are not 
“reasonably necessary” to accomplish the defendant’s objective.
124
 
The Collaboration Guidelines follow a similar approach.
125
 First, 
either the FTC or the DOJ begins by examining the nature of the 
defendant’s agreement to determine whether it has caused 
anticompetitive harm.
126
 If no such harm is evident, the inquiry 
ends.
127
 If the possibility of anticompetitive harm is clearly evident, 
or if it has resulted, the agencies “challenge such agreements without 
a detailed market analysis.”
128
 If the agreement at issue indicates the 
possibility of anticompetitive harm, the agencies scrutinize the 
defendant’s agreement by conducting a detailed market analysis.
129
 
 
 119. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 610 F.3d at 830. 
 120. See id. 
 121. 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 122. Id. at 234, 237. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 610 F.3d at 830. 
 125. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 10–12. 
 126. Id. at 10. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 10–11. 
 129. Id. at 11. At the market-analysis stage, the agencies look at several factors, including 
whether an agreement is “exclusive or non-exclusive,” the “duration of the collaboration,” and 
“whether entry [into the market] would be timely, likely, and sufficient to deter or counteract any 
anticompetitive harms.” Id. If no anticompetitive harm is apparent, the inquiry ends and the court 
will not find a Section 1 violation. Id. If the market analysis reveals anticompetitive harm, the 
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The Supreme Court first applied the rule of reason in Broadcast 
Music, Inc. v. CBS, which involved a horizontal agreement that fixed 
a common price for the licensing of musical compositions.
130
 In 
doing so, the Court acknowledged that federal courts should initially 
consider whether a restraint “appears to be one that would always or 
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”
131
 
Following its decision in Broadcast Music, Inc., the Supreme Court 
used the rule of reason to analyze other horizontal agreements with 
potential efficiency justifications.
132
 In NCAA v. Board of Regents of 
the University of Oklahoma,
133
 the Court applied the rule of reason to 
an agreement limiting the number of times that a college sports team 
from the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) could 
appear on television as well as the fees that these teams could receive 
from the networks.
134
 Although the agreement at issue was a 
horizontal price fixing and output limitation agreement that would 
have been automatically illegal under the per se approach, the Court 
applied the rule of reason because the restraint at issue “involve[d] 
an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are 
essential if the product is to be available at all.”
135
 The Court 
continued this trend, expanding the application of the rule of reason 
 
agency “examine[s] whether the relevant agreement is reasonably necessary to achieve 
procompetitive benefits that likely would offset any anticompetitive harms.” Id. at 11–12. 
 130. 441 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1979). 
 131. Id. at 19–20. 
 132. Piraino, supra note 4, at 1758. 
 133. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 134. Id. at 94. 
 135. Id. at 99–101. The Court ultimately struck down the defendant’s procompetitive 
justifications for the agreement since the television plan did not promote a competitive balance 
among amateur athletic teams. Id. at 117–20. The Court believed that protecting live attendance 
was not a legitimate goal and that the NCAA’s restraint did not help to protect it. Id. at 115–17. 
Additionally, it is important to note that the creation of a new product is not a necessary 
prerequisite to trigger the application of the rule of reason. The rule of reason can also apply if the 
defendant’s conduct or agreement creates procompetitive efficiencies. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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throughout the 1980s.
136
 Today, the rule of reason is the most 
common method of evaluating horizontal restraints on trade.
137
 
3.  Application of the Quick Look Approach 
by the Federal Courts 
The quick look approach is an intermediate standard that 
“applies in cases where per se condemnation is inappropriate but 
where no elaborate industry analysis [under the rule of reason] is 
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of an 
inherently suspect restraint.”
138
 Under the quick look approach, the 
defendant’s restraint carries a presumption of anticompetitiveness 
that the defendant can rebut only by offering procompetitive 
efficiencies that justify the restraint.
139
 Thus, the court initially tries 
to determine whether the restraint carries obvious anticompetitive 
effects.
140
 At this level, the inquiry is focused on whether “an 
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could 
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an 
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”
141
 Where the 
effect of a horizontal restraint appears complex on its face, however, 
“assumption[s] alone will not do.”
142
 Instead, a court must properly 
identify the anticompetitive effects of a restraint and determine 
whether those effects are actually anticompetitive.
143
 
Once the court has clearly decided that the effects of the 
restraint are anticompetitive, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
offer “some competitive justification” for the restraint.
144
 If the 
 
 136. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (holding that although the 
conduct at issue resembled a group boycott that would normally be deemed per se illegal, the rule 
of reason should apply because the economic impact of the horizontal agreement was not 
immediately obvious); Nw. Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 
298 (1985) (holding that the per se approach should not apply since a “mere allegation of a 
concerted refusal to deal does not suffice [as anticompetitive conduct] because not all concerted 
refusals to deal are predominantly anticompetitive”). 
 137. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 829–30 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 138. Id. at 830 (quoting United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
 139. Id. at 831. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).  
 142. Id. at 775 n.12. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 610 F.3d at 831 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
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defendant cannot carry this burden, then the restraint is illegal under 
a quick look analysis.
145
 If, however, the defendant is able to offer a 
legitimate procompetitive justification for the restraint, the court 
abandons the quick look approach and engages in a rule of reason 
analysis.
146
 
While the Court in NCAA used the rule of reason to analyze the 
restraints at issue, it stated that this approach can sometimes be 
applied “in the twinkling of an eye”
147
—language that some legal 
scholars consider to be the origin of the quick look approach.
148
 In 
NCAA, the NCAA argued that its agreement limiting collegiate 
sports’ teams television appearances did not have “significant 
anticompetitive effects” because the NCAA possessed no market 
power.
149
 The Court rejected this argument, holding that “the 
absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction 
on price or output.”
150
 According to the Court, “when there is an 
agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, ‘no elaborate 
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive 
character of such an agreement.’”
151
 The Court has “never required 
proof of market power in such a case.”
152
 Therefore, even in the 
absence of a detailed market analysis, a naked restraint on price and 
output requires some competitive justification. 
Along with NCAA, the Court’s decision in FTC v. Indiana 
Federation of Dentists
153
 is also regarded as paving the way for the 
quick look approach.
154
 In Indiana Federation of Dentists, a group of 
professional dentists (the “Federation”), made an argument similar to 
the NCAA plaintiffs’: the FTC could not identify a relevant market in 
which the Federation restrained trade, and therefore the Federation 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39 (1984) (quoting 
PHILLIP AREEDA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE “RULE OF REASON” IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: 
GENERAL ISSUES 37–38 (1981)). 
 148. James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust Claims 
After American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 531 n.54 (2011). 
 149. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 110. 
 153. 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
 154. McKeown, supra note 148, at 530–31. 
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did not unreasonably restrain trade.
155
 In rejecting the FTC’s 
argument, the Indiana Federation of Dentists Court reaffirmed its 
decision in NCAA by holding that the FTC’s failure to engage in a 
detailed market analysis did not defeat the FTC’s finding that the 
Federation’s conduct was illegal under the rule of reason.
156
 
According to the Court, because the purpose of market analysis is to 
determine whether an agreement or conduct can adversely affect 
competition, “‘proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction 
of output,’ can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power.”
157
 
Thus, the Court held that the Federation violated Section 1 under the 
rule of reason and did not provide a detailed analysis of market 
power.
158
 
III.  WHERE DO WE DRAW THE LINE, 
IF A LINE CAN BE DRAWN AT ALL? 
Although it may seem that the Court has clearly established 
three approaches to analyze horizontal restraints that potentially 
violate Section 1, the use of these approaches has created a great deal 
of uncertainty among lower federal courts and American firms.
159
 
Oftentimes it is difficult to see how courts decide which approach to 
apply. One way to offer insight into this problem is to look at how 
the federal courts have limited or expanded the application of these 
approaches. The next section looks at lower federal court decisions 
in the past five years and shows how courts continue to use the rule 
of reason while limiting the use of the per se and quick look 
approaches. 
A.  Limits on the Per Se Approach 
The most significant limit that the Supreme Court has placed on 
the per se approach was to preclude its application where the 
restraint on competition produces procompetitive efficiencies or is 
 
 155. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 460–61. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Gustman & Anderson, supra note 1, at 205. 
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“essential if the product is to be available at all.”
160
 The Supreme 
Court, along with the lower federal courts, has consistently upheld 
this limitation.
161
 For example, when defendants are members of a 
joint venture that requires a certain degree of cooperation to compete 
in the relevant market or to market a product, any horizontal restraint 
that they impose will be subject to the rule of reason as long as most 
of their regulatory controls are procompetitive.
162
 Thus, even if the 
restraint at issue is a price-fixing agreement, courts apply the rule of 
reason because the horizontal agreement is necessary for the joint 
venture to function.
163
 
In its 2010 decision, a court in the Northern District of Illinois in 
In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litigation
164
 did not apply the per se 
approach when considering the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment, even though it could have.
165
 The plaintiffs brought suit 
against producers of sulfuric acid, alleging that these producers 
conspired “to reduce the output and fix the price of sulfuric acid in 
Canada and the United States.”
166
 In analyzing whether the plaintiffs 
offered enough facts to prove that the defendants’ restraint was per 
se illegal, the court exercised caution in deciding whether to apply 
the per se approach.
167
 According to the court, a plaintiff cannot 
 
 160. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984); e.g., Broad. 
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979). A horizontal restraint does not always have to produce 
a new product in order to trigger the application of the rule of reason. See supra note 5. 
 161. E.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 
U.S. 1, 7 (2006); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 831 (3d Cir. 2010); In 
re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 162. See In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1014. 
 163. Id. 
 164. 743 F. Supp. 2d 827 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 165. Id. at 865. 
 166. Id. at 835. The plaintiffs argued that the rule of reason should not apply and instead 
focused on the application of the per se approach. Id. at 864. The plaintiffs did not discuss the 
challenged practices’ anticompetitive effects or the defendants’ market power in the relevant 
market. Id. As a result, the court held that the plaintiffs waived their rule of reason argument. Id. 
at 865. 
 167. Id. The defendants first argued that the courts do not have enough experience with their 
conduct to be able to apply the per se approach. Id. at 869. The court rejected this argument, 
holding that the defendants’ alleged agreement is a classic price-fixing and output-restriction 
agreement. Id. Next, under the ancillary restraints doctrine, the defendants argued that the output-
reduction agreements served to make their joint venture successful. Id. at 872. The court found 
the defendants’ argument “problematic.” Id. It held that “a restraint is only ancillary if it [is] 
necessary to achieve otherwise unattainable procompetitive benefits.” Id. According to the court, 
a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants’ conduct was not ancillary. Id. at 874. But 
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benefit from the per se standard at trial unless one could conclude 
from the undisputed facts in the case that the challenged conduct was 
“of the type” that is customarily regarded as illegal per se.
168
 
Because the plaintiffs were unable to present undisputed facts 
that the defendants’ conduct was per se illegal, the court did not 
decide whether it could apply the per se approach.
169
 Instead, it held 
that there were “enough issues of contested material fact to preclude 
both summary judgment on the merits and the determination of the 
appropriate legal standard.”
170
 However, the court noted that if it 
became clear that the defendants acted in the way that the plaintiffs 
described, the defendants’ conduct would constitute a per se 
violation.
171
 The holding in In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litigation 
may foreshadow a trend toward exercising a cautious reluctance to 
apply the per se approach to alleged Section 1 violations, even if it is 
potentially applicable. 
The Supreme Court in Texaco Inc. v. Dagher
172
 also limited the 
use of the per se approach by applying the rule of reason when 
plaintiffs challenged the “core activity” of a joint venture.
173
 
Consistent with Dagher, a California district court in In re ATM Fee 
Antitrust Litigation
174
 applied the rule of reason when the plaintiffs 
challenged a joint venture’s right to set an interchange network fee—
an activity that the court determined was at the “core” of the joint 
venture.
175
 According to the court, “Dagher teaches that such 
 
because a dispute remained over whether such conduct was ancillary, the court could not 
determine whether the per se or rule of reason should apply. Id.  
 168. Id. at 865. 
 169. See id. at 887. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 173. Id. at 5. The joint venture in Dagher was formed by two oil companies that consolidated 
to refine and sell gasoline in the United States. Id. at 3. After the joint venture set a single price 
for both brands of gasoline, the plaintiffs challenged the joint venture’s agreement to set a unified 
price. Id. at 4. The Supreme Court held this practice to be part of the joint venture’s “core 
activity.” Id. at 7–8. The Court further precluded the application of the per se approach to joint 
ventures that set their own prices. According to the Court, a single entity that sets its own prices is 
not guilty of price fixing. Id. at 6. While this activity may be “price fixing in the literal sense, it is 
not price fixing in the antitrust sense.” Id. For more analysis on what a “core” activity is, see infra 
Part IV.A and note 230. 
 174. 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 175. See id. at 1013. 
  
1202 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1173 
 
challenges [to the joint venture’s core activity] must be analyzed 
under the rule of reason.”
176
 
Indeed, the federal courts are universally reluctant to expand the 
application of the per se approach.
177
 This reluctance is appropriate 
given the goals of antitrust law. Joint ventures are formed to make 
production more efficient, develop more innovative products, and 
deliver the best price possible to the consumer.
178
 Courts do not want 
to inhibit their growth by blindly holding a joint venture’s conduct 
per se illegal when it can instead analyze and weigh the 
procompetitive efficiencies of the alleged anticompetitive restraint to 
determine Section 1 legality.
179
 Doing so would make it more 
difficult for American firms to provide the most competitive price to 
the consumer. 
B.  Limits on the Rule of Reason 
Because the rule of reason has become the default analysis to 
determine the legality of a horizontal restraint, the courts have not 
placed many limits on its application.
180
 In fact, many of the limits 
placed on the per se approach have in turn expanded the application 
of the rule of reason.
181
 At the same time, where per se treatment is 
 
 176. Id. The court cited to NCAA, pointing out that the Supreme Court held that when 
“horizontal agreements are necessary for the functioning of a joint venture, all horizontal 
agreements among members of that venture . . . should be subject to the Rule of Reason.” Id. at 
1014. The court pointed out that the holding in NCAA would compel it to apply the rule of reason 
to the restraint at issue. Id. at 1015. But, the court turned to Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of 
Realtors, a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case that has limited the application of NCAA. Id. In 
Freeman, the Ninth Circuit held that for NCAA to apply, “the particular restraint at issue must be 
‘reasonably ancillary to the legitimate cooperative aspects of the [joint] venture.’” Id. (quoting 
Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003)). Thus, defendants 
must prove two things: that their joint venture requires a horizontal restraint and that the 
particular restraint is ancillary to the joint venture’s legitimate business operations. Id. The court 
in In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation held that the defendant’s conduct also fell under the 
Freeman limitation, making the rule of reason the proper approach. See id. at 1017. 
 177. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust 
Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 827, 887 (N.D. Ill. 2010); In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1014. 
 178. Piraino, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
 179. Piraino, supra note 74, at 651. 
 180. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010); Deutscher Tennis Bund 
v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 829–30 (3d Cir. 2010); In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1014. 
 181. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984); 
Broad. Music Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979). 
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appropriate, the rule of reason has a limited application.
182
 For 
example, when the anticompetitive effects of a horizontal restraint 
are unclear, courts use the rule of reason rather than the per se 
approach so that they can fully consider the procompetitive 
justifications of the alleged restraint.
183
 Conversely, when a restraint 
is plainly anticompetitive, courts do not need to engage in an 
extensive analysis of the relevant market or defendant’s market 
power. Accordingly, they use the per se approach, and not the rule of 
reason, to find such restraints illegal.
184
 Thus, the per se approach 
and the rule of reason function as a check on each other. 
C.  Limits on the Quick Look Approach 
In California Dental Ass’n v. FTC,
185
 the Supreme Court held 
that it was inappropriate to apply the quick look approach to 
advertising restrictions placed on members of the California Dental 
Association because the restrictions’ anticompetitive effects were not 
“obvious.”
186
 In reaching its decision, the Court made clear that the 
quick look approach should only be applied when the deciding court 
“has properly identified the theoretical basis for the anticompetitive 
effects and considered whether the effects actually are 
anticompetitive.”
187
 If the conduct “might plausibly be thought to 
have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on 
competition,” then the quick look approach is not applicable.
188
 
Thus, the Court recognized the quick look approach while 
simultaneously placing limits on it. 
Since the Court’s decision in California Dental, subsequent 
lower federal courts have been careful in applying the quick look 
 
 182. See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 7–8. In Broadcast Music, Inc., the court stated in 
dicta that there is no need to analyze defendants’ conduct or agreement under the rule of reason 
when it is “plainly anticompetitive.” Id. Instead, such an agreement or conduct is declared per se 
illegal. Id. 
 183. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collaborations Among 
Competitors, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1143–44 (2001) (stating that where the economic effects of 
a defendant’s conduct or agreement is ambiguous, the courts engage in a detailed analysis of the 
defendant’s restraint on the relevant market under the rule of reason). 
 184. See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 7–8. 
 185. 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 186. Id. at 774, 759. 
 187. See id. at 775 n.12. 
 188. See id. at 771. 
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approach.
189
 For example, in 2010, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc.
190
 held that 
applying the quick look approach to an agreement reorganizing the 
ATP tennis tour to increase popularity and exposure was not 
appropriate because “the definition of the relevant [tennis] market 
was one of the most contested issues at trial.”
191
 According to the 
court, a thorough market analysis was necessary because the relevant 
market was not “sufficiently well-known or defined” to allow a court 
to decide whether the reorganization agreement was 
anticompetitive.
192
 Similarly, in 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc.
193
 refused to 
apply the quick look approach to an agreement among a group of 
supermarket competitors to share revenues in the event of a strike or 
lockout.
194
 According to the court, the “unique features of the 
agreement”—along with “the uncertain effects these features had on 
the grocers’ competitive behavior”—were “not obvious.”
195
 The 
court specifically noted that in order to reach a confident conclusion 
about the anticompetitive effects of the agreement, “further 
development of the record [was] required.”
196
 The Ninth Circuit 
seems to have learned its lesson after the Supreme Court overturned 
its decision in California Dental because in Harris it did not apply 
the quick look approach to an agreement whose anticompetitive 
effects were unclear. 
Despite the infrequent use of the quick look approach
197
 by the 
federal courts in the last five years, in 2008, the court in North Texas 
 
 189. E.g., California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); 
Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 190. 610 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 191. Id. at 832. This case highlights the problem that under the rule of reason, courts focus too 
heavily on the defendant’s market power in a relevant market in order to decide whether the 
defendant’s restraint is anticompetitive. For more on this problem, see infra Part IV.C. 
 192. Id. Additionally, even if the anticompetitive effects of the agreement were obvious, the 
quick look analysis still would have been inappropriate because the defendants offered sound 
procompetitive justifications. Id. at 833. According to the court, once a defendant offers such 
procompetitive justifications, the quick look presumption disappears and a full-scale rule of 
reason analysis should be used. Id. 
 193. 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 194. Id. at 1122, 1137. 
 195. Id. at 1137.  
 196. Id. 
 197. See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1413 (2009). 
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Specialty Physicians v. FTC
198
 applied it appropriately.
199
 There, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the “net anticompetitive 
effects of the [North Texas Specialty Physicians’] NTSP’s practices 
were obvious” and that the procompetitive justifications offered by 
the NTSP did not “result in a net procompetitive effect.”
200
 In its 
holding, the NTSP court carefully noted that one reason that the 
Supreme Court found the quick look approach improper in 
California Dental was because the Ninth Circuit used empirical 
evidence to determine whether the defendant’s conduct resulted in 
any adverse anticompetitive effects.
201
 According to the Supreme 
Court, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on empirical evidence showed that 
it was lenient in “its enquiry into evidence of the restrictions’ 
anticompetitive effects.”
202
 Unlike the Ninth Circuit in California 
Dental, the FTC in North Texas Specialty Physicians (NTSP) “relied 
on the theoretical basis for the anticompetitive and procompetitive 
effects of NTSP’s” conduct.
203
 Thus, the NTSP court, through a 
“quick look,” held that the “NTSP engaged in concerted action to 
 
 198. 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 199. Id. at 363. 
 200. Id. at 362–63. The NTSP is an organization of independent physicians whose purpose is 
to “assemble physician groups and negotiate contracts between these groups and insurance 
[companies].” Id. at 352. The written contract that NTSP had with each of its physicians obligated 
the physician to refrain from pursuing an offer from an insurance company that the NTSP was 
negotiating with. Id. at 353. “This either foreclosed or delayed negotiations between these 
[insurance companies] and the physicians who were willing to accept a lower fee than the 
minimum fee determined by the NTSP.” Id. at 363. “If the NTSP did not consummate a contract 
with [the insurance company] in its negotiations, then [the insurance company’s] ability to 
bargain directly with the physician was delayed.” Id. As a result, the insurance company’s 
patients who were in need of medical services did not have access to NTSP’s physicians while 
negotiations were ongoing, which in turn reduced the number of competing physicians. Id. at 364. 
 201. Id. at 362. 
 202. Id. (quoting Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 776 (1999)). 
 203. Id. Under the Physician Participation Agreement between NTSP and a physician, if the 
NTSP was negotiating with a certain payor, the physician was not allowed to pursue an offer 
from that payor. Id. at 363. Therefore, if a physician was willing to accept from the payor a lower 
fee than the minimum required by the NTSP, he or she was prevented from doing so because the 
NTSP was already in talks with that payor. Id. The court inferred that if the NTSP closed the deal 
with a payor, the agreed-upon fee between the payor and the NTSP “would be higher than the 
minimum fees . . . that a NTSP member physician . . . w[as] willing to accept . . . .” Id. The FTC 
supported this through expert testimony. Id. Furthermore, turning to the issue of NTSP’s 
procompetitive justifications, the court rejected them, citing to “significant gaps in logic.” Id. at 
368. The court held that NTSP’s procompetitive justifications “do not meet the ‘might plausibly 
be thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all . . .’ threshold.” Id. at 
370. 
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increase its bargaining power,” which amounted to a horizontal price 
fixing agreement.
204
 The procompetitive justifications offered by the 
NTSP were not sufficient to overcome this finding.
205
 
IV.  INCONSISTENCIES AND UNCERTAINTIES 
AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS 
In expanding the rule of reason while significantly limiting the 
per se and quick look approaches, the federal courts have struggled 
to distinguish when each approach should apply. Instead of 
attempting to resolve this confusion, Justice Souter in California 
Dental compounded it: after holding that the quick look approach 
was inappropriate, Justice Souter went on to say,  
[O]ur categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are 
less fixed than terms like “per se,” “quick look,” and “rule 
of reason” tend to make them appear . . . . [T]here is 
generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints 
that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of 
anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed 
treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for 
the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic of 
a restraint.
206
 
As this part demonstrates, the federal courts still struggle with 
the Supreme Court’s inability to articulate clear and consistent 
standards to analyze horizontal restraints under Section 1. 
A.  The Ancillary Restraints Doctrine 
and Procompetitive Justifications 
The inability to clearly distinguish between the per se approach 
and rule of reason existed long before the Supreme Court began 
using the rule of reason as the dominant approach in evaluating 
 
 204. Id. at 367, 370. 
 205. Id. at 368–70. 
 206. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. at 779–81. Justice Souter, in the majority opinion, 
suggested yet another type of analysis that would fall between the quick look approach and the 
rule of reason. Id. Justice Souter pointed out that the plaintiffs had not shown the “obvious 
anticompetitive effect” that would trigger the quick look approach. Id. at 778. At the same time, 
Justice Souter wrote that this does “not . . . necessarily . . . call for the fullest market analysis” 
under the rule of reason. Id. at 779. According to the Court, “a less quick look” was required to 
determine the competitiveness of the defendant’s advertising restrictions. Id. at 781. 
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horizontal restraints. In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,
207
 
Topco Associates (“Topco”), a group of twenty-five regional 
supermarket chains, adopted “territorial restraints” to create a private 
label system to compete with larger supermarket chains.
208
 The 
district court found these territorial restraints to be procompetitive 
because they would enhance competition between Topco’s members 
and other supermarket chains.
209
 In ignoring the potential benefits of 
Topco’s restraints, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s 
decision and held these restraints to be per se unlawful.
210
 Justice 
Burger, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the majority did not 
examine whether the district court’s finding was correct but instead 
essentially said that “the District Court had no business examining 
Topco’s practices under the ‘rule of reason.’”
211
 The majority’s 
holding contradicted Judge Taft’s formulation of the ancillary 
restraints doctrine in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 
which stated that if a restraint is ancillary, it is exempt from per se 
treatment.
212
 The Court moved away from Topco’s reasoning in its 
subsequent decisions in Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA. Both cases 
involved a horizontal restraint on price competition, but in both 
cases, the Supreme Court refused to apply the per se rule because the 
horizontal restraint was necessary to ensure the product’s 
availability.
213
 
Lower federal courts struggled with the Topco decision after the 
Supreme Court decided Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA. For 
example, in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.,
214
 
the D.C. Circuit Court pointed out that its holding on the legality of 
Atlas Van Lines’s current carrier policy would differ depending on 
whether it followed the Topco line of reasoning or the Broadcast 
 
 207. 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
 208. Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the 
Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 469 (2000). 
 209. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 605–06. 
 210. Id. at 608. 
 211. Id. at 614 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 212. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(citing United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282–83 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 
U.S. 211 (1899)). 
 213. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984); Broad. 
Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979). 
 214. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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Music, Inc. and NCAA line of reasoning.
215
 Under Topco, the 
defendant’s restraint would have been per se illegal under Section 
1.
216
 Under Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA, the restraint imposed 
by the defendant would not have violated Section 1 because it was 
ancillary.
217
 The court in Rothery Storage ultimately adopted the 
Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA reasoning and held that the 
defendant’s conduct did not violate Section 1.
218
 According to the 
court, the restraint was ancillary to the defendant’s joint venture and 
did not “suppress market competition . . . [or] decrease output.”
219
 In 
reaching its decision, the court pointed out that the holdings of 
Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA overturned Topco.
220
 Yet the 
Supreme Court has not done so.
221
 
Confusion is further apparent when courts analyze whether a 
restraint is ancillary under the ancillary restraints doctrine. The lower 
federal courts have failed to uniformly distinguish between naked 
restraints—where the per se approach applies—and ancillary 
restraints—where the rule of reason applies.
222
 For example, “[s]ome 
courts have found that, in order to be ancillary, restraints must be 
‘plausibly related’ to a venture’s pro-competitive effects.”
223
 Others 
 
 215. Id. at 229. In Rothery Storage, Atlas Van Lines was a national moving company that 
contracted with independent moving companies across the nation to provide moving services to 
individuals and businesses. Id. at 211. Atlas Van Lines executed a standard contract with its 
independent agents, which prohibited the agents from affiliating or dealing with any other van 
line. Id. In 1979, the moving industry became deregulated and this produced a free-rider problem 
for Atlas. Id. at 212. As a result, Atlas instituted a new policy that allowed “any carrier agent 
already affiliated with Atlas [to] continue to exercise independent interstate authority only by 
transferring its independent interstate authority to a separate corporation with a new name.” Id. at 
213. This, in effect, rendered Atlas’s services or facilities unavailable to these new entities. Id. 
 216. Id. at 229. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Despite moving away from Topco in cases like Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA, the 
Supreme Court cited to it in Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc. In Palmer, the Court held that an 
agreement between two bar test-preparation companies to divide territories and not compete in 
each other’s territories was per se illegal. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990). 
The Court cited its decision in Topco, which held that “‘an agreement between competitors . . . to 
allocate territories in order to minimize competition’” is illegal. Id. at 49 (quoting United States v. 
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)). This signals that the Court is not ready to do 
away with Topco just yet. 
 222. Kolasky, supra note 27, at 135. 
 223. Piraino, supra note 9, at 745–46. California Dental supports the idea that a restraint must 
be plausibly related to the procompetitive effects of a joint venture to be ancillary. Id. at 746. 
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“have concluded that the restraints must be ‘reasonably related’ to 
such effects.”
224
 Also, a few courts have also held “that the restraints 
must be ‘essential’ to achieving the effects.”
225
 The Supreme Court 
had a chance to clarify the use of the ancillary restraints doctrine and 
provide guidance on how the courts should distinguish between 
naked and ancillary restraints.
226
 Instead, the Court created more 
confusion. 
In Dagher, Texaco Incorporated and Shell Oil Company agreed 
to form a joint venture, Equilon Enterprises, to “refine and sell 
gasoline in the Western United States.”
227
 Through Equilon, Texaco 
and Shell Oil agreed to a pricing policy that set the price of gasoline 
that they sold.
228
 The Court held that the ancillary restraints doctrine 
did not apply to the defendants’ joint venture because the plaintiffs 
were challenging the core activity of Equilon—namely, the pricing 
of its product, gasoline.
229
 Yet the Court failed to explain why it 
considered the pricing of Equilon’s gasoline a “core activity” of the 
joint venture.
230
 At the same time, the Court held that even if the 
ancillary restraints doctrine had applied, Equilon’s pricing policy 
was “clearly ancillary to the sale of its own products.”
231
 This 
 
 224. Id. at 746. Broadcast Music, Inc. supports the idea that a restraint must be reasonably 
related to the procompetitive effects of a joint venture to be ancillary. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 227. Id. at 3. 
 228. Id. at 6. 
 229. Id. at 7–8. 
 230. One possible interpretation of what the Court meant in its discussion of the “core 
activity” of a joint venture is that core activity is “the opposite of non-venture activity.” Holden, 
supra note 48, at 1477. Thus, if a specific restraint involves a core activity, as opposed to a 
nonventure activity, then the ancillary restraints doctrine cannot be the basis of finding that 
restraint unlawful. Id. Alternatively, analysis of what constitutes a joint venture’s core activity 
“could be an important new qualifier on the antitrust legal standards applied to joint ventures, or 
something in between.” Id. However, “it is clear that the pricing decisions of a legitimate, 
integrated joint venture are a ‘core’ activity to which ancillary restraints doctrine simply does not 
apply.” Id. This raises a question of the scope of what a “core activity” is. For example, if “core 
activity” covers all activities of a joint venture, how does this differ from an ancillary restraint? 
The answer to this question, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 231. Dagher, 547 U.S. at 8. The Ninth Circuit considered Texaco as an efficiency-enhancing 
joint venture. Holden, supra note 48, at 1476. However, this did not mean that the parties had 
“carte blanche ‘to do anything they please[d] with full immunity from per se analysis.’” Id. 
(quoting Dagher v. Saudi Ref., Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. Texaco 
Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1). According to the Ninth Circuit, the issue involving joint ventures is 
“whether the price fixing is 'naked' (in which case the restraint is per se illegal) or 'ancillary' (in 
which case it is not).” Id. 
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decision has left many courts and legal scholars wondering what 
constitutes a “core activity” of a joint venture and why the ancillary 
restraints doctrine did not apply where Equilon’s pricing policy was 
ancillary.
232
 
B.  Distinguishing Between 
the Rule of Reason and Per Se Approach 
with Greater Confidence 
A widespread belief among the courts and legal scholars that a 
great deal of uncertainty exists in the area of horizontal restraints is 
nothing new.
233
 Considerable confusion is still apparent, especially in 
the federal courts in California.
234
 For example, in 2008, a district 
court in the Northern District of California in In re ATM Fee 
Antitrust Litigation held that although the rule of reason should apply 
to an agreement fixing prices of interchange fees in the Star ATM 
network, “there remains serious doctrinal confusion over the proper 
analysis of cooperative arrangements among competitors.”
235
 The 
court certified a request to the Ninth Circuit to determine whether the 
plaintiff’s antitrust claim was correctly decided under the rule of 
reason or whether the per se approach should have been used 
instead.
236
 
This is not the only confusion that exists in California. In 
California ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc.,
237
 the Ninth Circuit 
struggled in applying the per se approach, the rule of reason, and the 
quick look approach.
238
 Initially, a California district court denied the 
 
 232. See Holden, supra note 48, at 1477. 
 233. Piraino, supra note 2, at 12. 
 234. See, e.g., California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc); In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 235. In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1017 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 236. Id. The Ninth Circuit declined to address the question. In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 
768 F. Supp. 2d 984, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 237. 615 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d en banc sub nom. Harris, 651 F.3d 1118. At issue in 
this case was a collective bargaining agreement on the eve of expiration between local chapters of 
a union and the defendants, three large supermarket chains. Id. at 1175. The defendant grocers 
entered into a Mutual Strike Assistance Agreement with each other. Id. This agreement contained 
a “revenue sharing agreement,” which stated, “in the event of a lockout or strike, any firm that 
earned revenues above its historical share of the combined revenues of all four firms would 
redistribute 15% of those surplus revenues among the other chains according to a fixed formula.” 
Id. at 1175–76. 
 238. See id. at 1182–84. 
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state’s motion for summary judgment, which asked the court to 
declare the defendants’ revenue-sharing agreement per se illegal or, 
alternatively, unlawful under the quick look approach.
239
 The State 
of California appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
240
 Here, the court took 
into account Justice Souter’s warning in California Dental that there 
is “no bright-line” distinction between the three categories of 
analysis and that what is required is an “enquiry meet for the 
case.”
241
 
As a result, the court came up with a mixed approach: consider 
“the history of [the] judicial experience with profit sharing 
agreements, apply rudimentary economic principles to the meaning 
and effects of the . . . agreement in question, and thoroughly analyze 
the circumstances, details and logic of the agreement in order to 
determine the likelihood of anticompetitive effects.”
242
 The next step 
under this mixed approach is to consider the defendants’ offered 
procompetitive justifications.
243
 The ultimate issue is whether, after 
conducting this mixed-approach analysis, the court could reach a 
“confident conclusion that the principal tendency of [the] defendants’ 
agreement [was] anticompetitive.”
244
 Using this approach, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the defendants’ procompetitive justifications and 
held that the anticompetitive effects of the defendants’ agreement 
were easily ascertainable.
245
 Thus, under this mixed approach, the 
Ninth Circuit was able to confidently conclude that the agreement 
violated Section 1 and that the rule of reason was not necessary.
246
 
The Ninth Circuit subsequently reheard the case en banc
247
 and 
held that the rule of reason was the proper approach for determining 
the legality of the defendants’ revenue-sharing provision.
248
 The 
Ninth Circuit held that the quick look approach was not appropriate 
because “[t]he unique features of the arrangement among the 
grocers . . . and the uncertain effect these features had on [their] 
 
 239. Id. at 1177. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 1179 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 758 (1999)). 
 242. Id. at 1183. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 1179. 
 245. Id. at 1189. 
 246. Id. at 1189, 1192. 
 247. California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 248. Id. at 1139. 
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competitive behavior” rendered any anticompetitive effect of the 
agreement not obvious.
249
 This holding is consistent with those of 
other courts
250
 that have precluded a quick look application when a 
restraint’s anticompetitive effects were not obvious, and it further 
indicates that the Ninth Circuit has finally learned when to apply the 
quick look approach. 
As these cases demonstrate, courts still find it difficult to decide 
which approach to apply. Yet a small number of recent lower federal 
court decisions signal that these courts are distinguishing between 
the rule of reason and per se approach with increasing confidence.
251
 
For example, in Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s application of the 
rule of reason to an agreement that reorganized the ATP Tennis Tour 
in order to increase popularity and better compete with other sporting 
events.
252
 First, the Third Circuit held that the district court correctly 
determined that the per se approach should not apply to the ATP 
Tennis Tour because, in a tennis tour, “horizontal restraints . . . are 
essential if the product is to be available at all.”
253
 Next, the Third 
Circuit determined that the district court properly declined to apply 
the quick look approach because “the definition of the relevant 
market was one of the most contested issues at trial.”
254
 Because the 
relevant market was not properly defined, the quick look approach 
was inappropriate.
255
 Furthermore, because the defendant offered 
“‘sound procompetitive justifications,’” the district court correctly 
shifted the analysis from the quick look approach to the rule of 
reason.
256
 
 
 249. Id. at 1137. According to the court, because the length of the agreement among the 
defendants was short and there were other supermarkets, or competitors, in the market, the 
agreement among the defendants was “unique.” Id. Thus, the competitive effects of the agreement 
were not clear enough to support application of the quick look approach. Id. 
 250. E.g., Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 251. E.g., Deutscher Tennis Bund, 610 F.3d 820; Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. USS-POSCO 
Indus., No. CV F 09-0560, 2010 WL 3521979 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010). 
 252. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 610 F.3d at 824, 833. 
 253. Id. at 831 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 
(1984)). 
 254. Id. at 832–33. 
 255. Id. at 832 
 256. Id. at 832–33. 
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Additionally, in its order on a motion to dismiss, a court in the 
Eastern District of California held in Stanislaus Food Products Co. v. 
USS-POSCO Industries
257
 that the plaintiff failed to allege facts that 
the defendants’ conduct violated both the per se and rule of reason.
258
 
The court pointed out that the plaintiff, in its own brief, admitted that 
the defendants “legitimately operated and competed with [other 
manufacturers] without antitrust implications.”
259
 Accordingly, the 
court held that the plaintiff had failed to allege that the defendants 
engaged in anticompetitive conduct, thus precluding an application 
of the per se approach.
260
 Furthermore, the court held that the rule of 
reason was similarly inapplicable because the plaintiff had failed to 
prove facts that the defendants unreasonably restrained trade.
261
 
According to the court, the plaintiff did “not allege that the operation 
of [the defendants] resulted in competitors exiting the market.”
262
 
Because the plaintiff was unable to plead facts sufficient to trigger 
either the per se approach or rule of reason, the court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim.
263
 The district court did not demonstrate any 
confusion in reaching its decision. 
C.  Problems with the Rule of Reason 
While courts are distinguishing between the rule of reason and 
per se approach with greater confidence, there are still problems 
inherent in the application of the rule of reason. “The rule of reason 
has been criticized for its inaccuracy, its poor administrability, its 
subjectivity, its lack of transparency, and its yielding inconsistent 
results.”
264
 Rather than clarifying these problems, the Supreme Court 
and the circuit courts have focused instead on whether the per se or 
rule of reason approach should apply and not on how the actual rule 
of reason analysis should be carried out at the district court level.
265
 
 
 257. No. CV F 09-0560 LJO SMS, 2010 WL 3521979 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010). 
 258. Id. at *23. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at *24. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at *23–24, *32. 
 264. Stucke, supra note 197, at 1421. 
 265. Piraino, supra note 9, at 739. 
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As a result, district courts have little to work with when they engage 
in an actual rule of reason analysis.
266
 
Problems with the rule of reason do not affect only the courts. 
Many plaintiffs are reluctant to initiate rule of reason cases because 
of the high cost associated with proving an antitrust violation under 
this approach.
267
 In order for the plaintiff to be successful under the 
rule of reason, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct 
or agreement results in anticompetitive effects either by proving the 
existence of actual anticompetitive effects or by demonstrating that 
the defendant has market power in a particular market.
268
 Plaintiffs 
often rely on circumstantial evidence to demonstrate market 
power.
269
 For instance, the plaintiff may introduce evidence of a high 
market share by offering expert testimony or documentary 
evidence.
270
 Because so much of the defendant’s liability depends on 
how broadly the judge or jury defines the relevant market, it is hardly 
surprising that parties devote so many of their litigation resources to 
framing the relevant market to each party’s benefit.
271
 
What defines the relevant market in each case often becomes the 
most contested issue at trial.
272
 As mentioned above in Part II.B, the 
court in Meijer was unable to determine on summary judgment the 
proper relevant market because the plaintiff and the defendant 
presented conflicting definitions of the relevant market to support 
their own positions. In Wampler v. Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Co.,
273
 the issue of what constituted the proper geographic market 
went on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
274
 On appeal in Southeast 
Missouri Hospital v. C.R. Bard, Inc.
275
 was the issue of what 
 
 266. Id. at 739–40. 
 267. Piraino, supra note 4, at 1761; Piraino, supra note 9, at 739. 
 268. See Piraino, supra note 4, at 1761–62. 
 269. Stucke, supra note 197, at 1425. 
 270. Piraino, supra note 4, at 1761. 
 271. See Stucke, supra note 197, at 1425–26; see also Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharm., Inc., 572 F. 
Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating that the relevant oral contraceptive market could not be 
determined on summary judgment because both parties defined the relevant market to their own 
advantage).  
 272. See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 439 & n.2 
(2010). 
 273. 597 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 274. Id. at 743. The court held that appellants’ Section 1 claim failed because they were 
unable to define a proper geographic market. Id. at 746. 
 275. 642 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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constituted the proper product submarket.
276
 While the majority in 
that case held that the plaintiff failed to define a proper product 
submarket, the dissent disagreed, arguing that there were factual 
disputes regarding the scope of the relevant product market and the 
defendant’s market power.
277
 These recent cases demonstrate that the 
courts dedicate an unnecessary amount of time and number of 
resources to analyzing the definition of the relevant market under the 
rule of reason. In the majority of cases, the plaintiff fails to prove a 
relevant product or geographic market and the claim is dismissed.
278
 
As the Eighth Circuit has said, “Antitrust claims often rise or fall on 
the definition of the relevant market.”
279
 
V.  SOLUTIONS 
This Article has demonstrated that there remains a serious lack 
of unity among the federal courts in applying Section 1 to horizontal 
restraints. This lack of unity has led to confusion among the district 
courts and circuit courts.
280
 In an attempt to simplify the confusion, 
this part proposes three solutions that will help to clarify the law of 
horizontal restraints under Section 1. Part V.A advocates for 
abandoning the quick look approach. Part V.B then argues that, to 
make things simpler, courts should either use the ancillary restraints 
doctrine or look to the defendants’ procompetitive justifications in 
determining whether to apply the rule of reason. If a court chooses 
the ancillary restraints doctrine, it should use a “reasonably 
necessary” standard to determine how related the ancillary restraint 
is to a horizontal agreement. Finally, Part V.C offers several 
 
 276. Id. at 613. In the Eighth Circuit, a product market can contain well-defined submarkets. 
Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 614 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)). 
To determine a submarket, the court listed a number of factors, including “public recognition of 
its separate economic character, special uses or characteristics or production facilities, distinct 
customers or prices, price sensitivity, and specialized vendors.” Id. at 614. In Southeast Missouri 
Hospital, the plaintiff failed to establish a relevant submarket. Id. at 614–17. 
 277. Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 625 (Beam, J., dissenting). 
 278. See Little Rock Cardiology PA v. Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591, 596 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 279. Id. (citing Bathke v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 64 F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 1995)) 
(holding that the plaintiff erroneously defined the relevant product market, thereby precluding any 
antitrust claim); see also Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 
2008) (reversing the district court’s holding that the plaintiff failed to allege a relevant market and 
remanding for further consideration of additional factors to determine relevant market share). 
 280. See California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
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suggestions that can make the application of the rule of reason more 
effective. 
A.  Abandon the Quick Look Approach 
As discussed above, courts have used the quick look approach 
infrequently since it was officially adopted by the Supreme Court in 
California Dental.
281
 Many district courts that have attempted to 
apply the quick look approach have done so incorrectly and have 
been overturned by the circuit courts.
282
 In other cases, the courts 
have found the defendant’s anticompetitive effects were not so 
obvious as to warrant quick look treatment.
283
 Furthermore, even if a 
defendant’s conduct is clearly anticompetitive, if the defendant offers 
procompetitive justifications, then the analysis shifts from the quick 
look approach to the rule of reason.
284
 Taking these issues into 
account, courts should abandon the quick look approach for several 
reasons.
285
 
First, the quick look approach applies only when a defendant’s 
anticompetitive conduct is obvious.
286
 If it is, the court skips the 
daunting analysis of the relevant market and the defendant’s market 
share and goes straight to considering the defendant’s procompetitive 
justifications.
287
 This may be an efficient step, but once the defendant 
offers any legitimate procompetitive justification for its action, the 
court must abandon the quick look approach and begin its analysis 
anew using the rule of reason.
288
 This means that the court must 
analyze the relevant market and the defendant’s market share. Taking 
 
 281. See supra Part III.C. 
 282. E.g., California ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 283. E.g., Harris, 651 F.3d. 1118. 
 284. See id. at 1134. 
 285. Professor Alan J. Meese also advocates for abandoning the quick look approach. Meese, 
supra note 206, at 464–65. He argues that the courts should use a full-blown rule of reason 
analysis to “any restraint that is plausibly procompetitive, even if the restraint appears to affect 
price or output.” Id. at 465–66. This is because advances in modern economic theory have shown 
that horizontal restraints previously thought to be anticompetitive are in many instances attempts 
to minimize costs associated with market contracting and therefore are actually procompetitive. 
Id. at 479–80. For example, in Topco, the territorial restraints were formed to reduce transaction 
costs in distributing the private label brand. Id. at 480. According to Professor Meese, there is “no 
good reason to presume such restraints unlawful without proof of anticompetitive effect.” Id. 
Thus, they deserve treatment under the rule of reason. 
 286. See Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830–31 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 287. See id. at 831. 
 288. Id. 
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into account the federal courts’ track record of rarely applying the 
quick look approach, the quick look has turned into a tool that stands 
in the way of the eventual application of the rule of reason. 
Further, the courts already have a working approach to utilize if 
the defendant’s conduct is found to have obvious anticompetitive 
effects: the per se approach. As the courts have universally held, 
conduct that appears plainly anticompetitive is deemed illegal under 
the per se approach.
289
 A defendant’s conduct that is “obvious” under 
the quick look approach can surely be “plainly anticompetitive” 
under the per se approach. If the court does not want to expand the 
per se approach to a defendant’s obvious anticompetitive conduct, a 
plaintiff can still prevail under the rule of reason without undertaking 
the tedious relevant market analysis by instead proving the 
anticompetitive effects of the defendant’s conduct. Because the 
conduct in this situation would be so obviously anticompetitive that 
the quick look would condemn it, the plaintiff should have no 
problem proving the direct effects of the defendant’s anticompetitive 
conduct under the rule of reason. Therefore, together the per se 
approach and rule of reason sufficiently safeguard the plaintiff where 
the defendant’s conduct is plainly anticompetitive. 
Doing away with the quick look approach will also simplify 
matters for both courts and litigators. For example, in the federal 
courts, there will be less back-and-forth between the district court 
and circuit court regarding the application of the quick look 
approach. Courts can return to focusing on and improving the use of 
the per se approach and rule of reason. Similarly, litigators will now 
focus only on two possible approaches and will not need to prepare 
unnecessarily for a quick look analysis that might not even be used. 
B.  Apply the Rule of Reason 
with Greater Clarity 
If the quick look approach is abandoned, the federal courts could 
focus on creating a unified approach to the ancillary restraints 
doctrine, since there currently appears to be varying interpretations 
of the ancillary restraints doctrine.
290
 Further, the courts do not use a 
 
 289. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1979). 
 290. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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universal approach when determining how related a restraint must be 
in order to be declared ancillary.
291
 As Part IV.A described, a 
restraint can be “plausibly related,” “reasonably related,” or 
“essential” to a joint venture’s procompetitive effects.
292
 Moreover, 
this Article has emphasized that when deciding whether to apply the 
rule of reason, a court either looks at the defendant’s procompetitive 
justifications or uses the ancillary restraints doctrine. However, there 
is no difference between which analysis the court engages in 
because, ultimately, the court reaches the same result under both 
approaches. To do away with the confusion surrounding the 
application of the rule of reason, the courts should first choose either 
to analyze the defendant’s procompetitive justifications or to use the 
ancillary restraints doctrine. If the courts choose to utilize the 
ancillary restraints doctrine in determining whether to apply the rule 
of reason, then they should adopt a “reasonably necessary” standard 
to analyze how related to the joint venture a restraint must be in 
order to be ancillary.
293
 
Using a “plausibly necessary” standard would allow almost all 
types of restraints to fall under the rule of reason. This would not be 
efficient because, under this standard, hardly any restraint would be 
determined to be a naked restraint. As a result, the rule of reason 
would apply to conduct that does not deserve such an analysis. 
Likewise, using an “essentially necessary” standard would be too 
high a threshold because conduct that is reasonably necessary but not 
essential would not be analyzed under the rule of reason. Instead, it 
would be analyzed, incorrectly, under the per se approach, which 
would frustrate the purpose of the ancillary restraints doctrine. 
Using a “reasonably necessary” standard would be the most 
efficient use of the ancillary restraints doctrine. First, both 
reasonably necessary restraints and essential restraints would fall 
under the umbrella of the “reasonably necessary” standard. Such a 
standard would cover a significant range of restraints while avoiding 
 
 291. See supra Part IV.A. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Thomas Piraino, Jr., argues that the legality of a joint venture’s restraint should be 
determined by its reasonableness. Piraino, supra note 9, at 795. For example, if a restraint is 
unrelated to a joint venture’s purpose, it is illegal under Section 1. Id. On the other hand, if a 
restraint is “reasonably necessary” to contribute to the purpose of the joint venture, then the 
restraint is legal. Id. 
  
Summer 2012] SHEDDING LIGHT 1219 
 
the risk of being too broad or too narrow. Additionally, if a restraint 
does not rise to the level of “reasonably necessary,” then the court 
should consider whether such a restraint is even ancillary to begin 
with. Finally, under the “reasonably necessary” standard, the more 
reasonable the restraint is, the more likely that it will be analyzed 
under the rule of reason. Therefore, the next time the Supreme Court 
has the opportunity to do so, it should clarify the application of the 
ancillary restraints doctrine and perhaps encourage the lower federal 
courts to apply a “reasonably necessary” standard under that 
doctrine. Doing so would restore the federal courts’ analysis to Judge 
Taft’s use of the ancillary restraints doctrine in United States v. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.
294
 
C.  Keep the Rule of Reason 
While the use of a “reasonably necessary” standard under the 
ancillary restraints doctrine will lead to a more efficient application 
of the doctrine, there remains concern over the application of the rule 
of reason. Although the rule of reason has been the dominant method 
of analysis in the courts, the academic community has advocated 
abandoning it, offering alternative approaches that the courts can 
use.
295
 For example, academics suggest that the courts adopt a 
continuum-based approach that focuses on the competitive purpose 
of the joint venture.
296
 Under such an approach, if the joint venture 
has a legitimate competitive purpose, then it is deemed legal.
297
 
 
 294. Id. at 794. Under Judge Taft’s analysis of the ancillary restraints doctrine, if the purpose 
of horizontal restraint is “to promote the objectives of a separate legitimate transaction, a court 
should uphold the restriction as an ‘ancillary’ restraint.” Piraino, supra note 2, at 5–6. But, if the 
horizontal restraint was “broader than necessary to achieve the [collaborator]’s legitimate 
objectives,” it would be struck down as nonancillary. Id. at 6. Thus, a court would first determine 
the legality of, for example, a joint venture, by looking at “the parties’ competitive purposes and 
the . . . impact of the joint venture on competition.” Id. If the court upholds the joint venture, then 
it should determine whether the restraint is “reasonably necessary to promote the legitimate 
purposes of the joint venture.” Id.; see also Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 
792 F.2d 210, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The alternative formulation was that of Judge Taft in 
Addyston Pipe & Steel: a naked horizontal restraint, one that does not accompany a contract 
integration, can have no purpose other than restricting output and raising prices, and so is illegal 
per se; an ancillary horizontal restraint, one that is part of an integration of the economic activities 
of the parties and appears capable of enhancing the group's efficiency, is to be judged according 
to its purpose and effect.”). 
 295. E.g., Piraino, supra note 2, at 5. 
 296. See id. at 28. 
 297. Id. at 28–29. 
  
1220 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1173 
 
Accordingly, the court would be able to focus on the competitive 
characteristics of the joint venture instead of “unnecessary inquiries 
into the parties’ market power.”
298
 Others have recommended ways 
to improve the rule of reason.
299
 Among these improvements the 
promulgation of new standards aimed at the legislative goals of the 
Sherman Act.
300
 
This Article proposes that once a court determines that the rule 
of reason is applicable, it should require plaintiffs to prove 
anticompetitive conduct by demonstrating the existence of actual 
anticompetitive effects instead of heavily focusing on market-share 
analysis. Several commentators have suggested a wide range of 
factors to accomplish this goal. For example, one scholar has 
suggested that courts may consider “the testimony of market 
participants, the internal and third-party market studies, pricing 
patterns [among competitors],” and even “views of the plaintiff.”
301
 
Additionally, the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which were 
jointly promulgated by the DOJ and FTC, state that in order to 
establish a relevant market, one can consider whether a defendant’s 
conduct reduced “the number of significant rivals offering a group of 
products, [which in turn] cause[d] prices for those products to rise 
significantly.”
302
 These guidelines further note that courts can 
consider the “customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away 
from one product to another in response to” the change in the 
product’s price or a decrease in the quality of the product or 
service.
303
 
Courts should also place more emphasis on the purpose behind 
the joint venture
304
 and the degree of integration between the 
 
 298. Id. at 5. Also, it has been suggested that courts should focus on the degree of integration 
achieved by the parties in a joint venture. Id. at 8, 28–30. 
 299. Stucke, supra note 197, at 1375. 
 300. Id. at 1480–81. Under this argument, the Sherman Act was never meant to act “as a 
vehicle for the Court to advance its own ideologies.” Id. at 1480. As a result, “[t]he Court should 
refrain from announcing new policies based on its perception of ‘modern’ economic theor[ies]” 
that are opposite from the Sherman Act’s aims. Id. at 1480–81. 
 301. James T. McKeown, 2008 Antitrust Developments in Professional Sports: To the Single 
Entity and Beyond, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 363, 383 & n.106 (2009). 
 302. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 7 
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Piraino, supra note 2, at 5. A “purpose-based approach would avoid both the harshness 
of the per se rule and the complexities of a market-based rule of reason . . . analysis.” Id. For 
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parties.
305
 For example, courts should look at the degree of 
integration between two or more parties on a continuum.
306
 If there is 
little to no integration, the court should be inclined to hold that the 
collaboration violates of Section 1.
307
 At the other extreme, if the 
parties are highly integrated, the court should be inclined to uphold 
the collaboration as legal.
308
 If the collaboration is at neither extreme 
but is instead in the middle of the continuum, the court may consider 
several factors to make its determination. For example, if a joint 
venture combines “assets such as technology, capital, or facilities,” it 
is integrated enough to survive per se treatment.
309
 If such integration 
results in cost savings and generates efficiencies, there is a strong 
argument that the restraint at issue is reasonable.
310
 However, this 
should not be a blanket rule. Courts should instead review each 
restraint on a case-by-case basis because a high degree of integration 
between two parties does not always make the conduct of the joint 
venture legal.
311
 A highly integrated joint venture may still produce 
anticompetitive effects, while a less integrated joint venture may not. 
While incorporating these factors into a court’s analysis may 
force that court to shift its emphasis away from the definition of the 
relevant market, such change does not come quickly or easily. In 
fact, as this Article has demonstrated, courts are still struggling to 
better apply the per se approach, the rule of reason, and the quick 
look approach in their decisions thirty years after the Court handed 
 
example, if a joint venture has a “legitimate competitive purpose, such as facilitating its partners’ 
entry into the market,” as opposed to an illegitimate one like “facilitat[ing] collusion in existing 
markets,” under the purpose-based approach, a court should uphold the legitimate joint venture 
because it is procompetitive. Id. 
 305. Piraino, supra note 183, at 1163–64. 
 306. See id. 
 307. Id. at 1163.  
 308. Id. 
 309. Piraino, supra note 2, at 28. 
 310. Thomas Piraino, Jr., argues that joint ventures should be presumed to be legal. Piraino, 
supra note 183, at 1164. Since joint ventures are only partially integrated, this allows both parties 
to the joint venture to collaborate and compete with each other at the same time within the same 
market. Id. The less integrated a joint venture is, the more it must show that the “venture brings 
together business functions of other resources previously held separately by the parties.” See infra 
note 311. 
 311. See Piraino, supra note 183, at 1166. To generate efficiencies, a joint venture must 
integrate its resources in “some way.” Id. If a joint venture is collaborating only to make “joint 
business decisions” or to “coordinate parallel activities,” then it is not a true joint venture and no 
economic benefit results. Id. 
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down its major decisions in Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA. 
Furthermore, there may be unknown issues, such as those regarding 
admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence, that may make 
incorporating these factors difficult. However, such challenges 
should not discourage courts from attempting to integrate these 
factors. As this Article argues, the emphasis on—and the difficulty 
of—establishing the definition of a defendant’s market share makes 
plaintiffs reluctant to bring Section 1 claims against collaborators 
and makes such cases difficult for them to win. This should not be 
the case, especially when the challenged restraint threatens consumer 
welfare. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
To shed light on one of the “darkest corners of antitrust law,”
312
 
the Supreme Court must issue a clear and consistent holding that the 
lower federal courts can use to better apply the per se approach and 
rule of reason to horizontal restraints. Unfortunately, progress takes 
time. In attempting to achieve this change, the federal courts must 
strive for simplicity. 
This Article has argued that the quick look approach should be 
abandoned because the per se approach and the rule of reason 
provide adequate safeguards that will hold competitors accountable 
when collaborating with each other. Such a result will free the 
courts’ time and resources and create greater consistency that 
American firms can rely on. This Article has also urged the Supreme 
Court to clarify its application of the ancillary restraints doctrine in 
Texaco by using a “reasonably related” standard to decide how 
related an ancillary restraint must be to a joint venture’s principal 
transaction. Finally, this Article has suggested that, when applying 
the rule of reason, courts should move away from emphasizing only 
the defendant’s share of the relevant market and instead focus also 
on other factors, including the degree of integration among the 
collaborators, internal or third party studies, and testimony of market 
participants. 
The federal courts have made progress in better administering 
the per se approach and the rule of reason. While considerable 
 
 312. Brodley, supra note 2, at 453. 
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confusion still exists, the small, but forward, progress that several 
circuit courts have made is promising. As long as the federal courts 
keep in mind the concept of simplicity and the interest of the 
consumer, the time will come when the regulation of the law of 
horizontal restraints will move out of the shadows and into the light. 
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